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RONALD J. TABAK
A major part of this discussion will concern what would happen to
habeas corpus 286 under legislation that has not yet been enacted but has
now passed both houses of Congress. 28" The discussion will also
286. Habeas corpus is a generic term embracing a variety of writs known to common
law. For purposes of this discussion, habeas corpus refers to challenges to allegedly
unconstitutional restraints on personal liberty, allowing a convicted criminal to
contest, on federal constitutional grounds, a state court's conduct and decisions in state
criminal cases. The statute governing federal habeas corpus appears at 28 U.S.C. §§
2241-2255 (1994).
287. H.R. 729, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§
601-607 (1995) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2255). See Comments by Professor
Larry Yackle, infra, at 561-68. Editor's Note: See supra text accompanying note I for
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concern (a) the election of state court judges, whose decisions will be
much less subject to challenge if the habeas corpus legislation is en-
acted;288 (b) the effectiveness or lack thereof of defense counsel; 2 9 (c)
the role of federally funded capital punishment resource centers,
whose funding has been eliminated; 29° (d) what at least some members
of the federal judiciary would feel about severely restricting habeas
corpus and eliminating resource center funding;29' (e) the perspectives
of two prosecutors who feel that the death penalty is not an effective
crime fighting tool; 292 (f) an Illinois case in which a death row inmate,
whom many believe is an innocent man, faces retrial; 293 and (g) Pope
John Paul II's recent encyclical articulating in a new way the Catholic
Church's views on capital punishment.294
We will start with a leading expert on the habeas corpus legislation,
Professor Larry Yackle of Boston University School of Law, who
specializes in constitutional law and the federal courts. No one has
fought harder to preserve habeas corpus.
PROFESSOR LARRY YACKLE
I'm very glad to appear here, since the ABA has been a powerful
source of help, support, and direction during the legislative battles
over the writ of habeas corpus.
We've been successful for years in defeating bad habeas corpus
proposals in Congress. Although no bad legislation has been enacted
yet this year, it appears that habeas corpus "reform" legislation could
well emerge this time.
I'm sorry to bring you bad news, but my charge is to take you
briefly through some of the key provisions of the bill that seems likely
to be enacted. The version the House passed earlier this year may be
the vehicle.29' But my guess is that the bill adopted by the Senate in
the current status of the habeas corpus legislation.
288. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, infra, at 569-80.
289. See Comments by Scharlette Holdman, infra, at 581-86.
290. Editor's Note: With respect to the status of the PCDOs as of the time of the
program, see Comments by Andrea Lyon, infra, at 587-91; all federal funding of the
PCDOs subsequently ceased. Reed, supra note 148 at AI.
291. See Comments by Susan Getzendanner, infra, at 591-93.
292. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, infra, at 594-601; Comments by Andrew
L. Sonner, infra, at 602-05.
293. See Comments by Jeffrey Urdangen, infra, at 606-10.
294. See Comments by Reverend Michael Place, infra, at 611-14.
295. H.R. 729, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Editor's Note: See supra text
accompanying note I for a discussion of the current status of the habeas corpus bill.
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June is more likely to be the basis for a new habeas law.296 Accord-
ingly, I will concentrate on the Senate bill.
Before I get into the details, let me speculate on why this is happen-
ing now. Obviously, many people in Congress see restrictions on
federal habeas corpus as a way of fostering capital punishment in the
various states. There's also a good deal of ideological talk about fed-
eralism and the notion that federal habeas corpus somehow intrudes
upon state prerogatives. I think there may be something in that, but
very little. I doubt that federalism really has much to do with it. This
goes very deep into conservative politics in the country. If this bill is
enacted, it will settle old scores. People have had deeply embedded
ideological commitments for many years, and now, in the more con-
servative atmosphere in Congress, the votes are finally there to do
something. This legislative attack on habeas corpus is another face of
the old attack on the Warren Court, and on procedural safeguards in
criminal cases in general.
I will focus on the Senate bill, which has two parts. The first part is
"general" habeas corpus legislation.2 97 Its provisions would become
applicable to all habeas cases, capital and non-capital, since they would
amend the various existing statutes on habeas corpus. 98 The second
part of the bill is focused on capital cases alone.299 It would establish a
new chapter of the judicial code on capital litigation in habeas cor-
pus.3°° It wouldn't automatically be applicable in any state, but would
have to be triggered by voluntary action in a particular state.3 1
This special chapter on capital cases really doesn't amount to a
whole lot in the Senate bill. The idea behind it is that states which use
capital punishment ought to be given incentives to provide counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings, i.e., state habeas corpus-like pro-
ceedings. So, a state could trigger the applicability of this new chapter
on capital litigation in habeas cases by establishing a mechanism that
296. S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 601-607 (1995).
297. S. 735 §§ 601-606.
298. If enacted, §§ 601-606 of the proposed bill would affect 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-
2255 (the existing habeas corpus statute). See S. 735 §§ 601-606.
299. S. 735 § 607 (creating 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266).
300. The second part of the bill creates chapter 154, entitled "Special Habeas Corpus
Procedures in Capital Cases." See S. 735 § 607.
301. S. 735 § 607 (creating 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b)). This section provides:
This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by statute, rule of its court of
last resort, or by another agency authorized by State law, a mechanism for the
appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses
of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by
indigent prisoners . . ..
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provides counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.0 2 In exchange,
the state would get some advantages when cases get to federal court.
Two advantages would probably be most important: the filing dead-
line would be shorter (six months rather than a year) and there would
be timetables for federal court action.30 3 Federal district judges would
have to decide cases within about six months of their being filed, and
federal circuit courts would have to decide appeals in about 120 days
after briefing is completed. 304 There are, however, some provisions
for extensions.30 5 The idea of giving states incentives to provide
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings is borrowed from the
Powell Committee Report from 1989.306
I don't know whether this part of the bill would be all that impor-
tant. If there is going to be a very tight filing deadline, I'm not sure it
would make much difference whether the deadline is six months or a
year. Either way, it's going to be nearly impossible to comply with.
And I'm not sure the timetables for federal court action would work at
all.30 7 I doubt that federal courts would put up with that. Also, I'm
not sure what the systems that states might set up in exchange for these
advantages would look like. Some states already provide counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings, although those lawyers often don't
deliver good representation.3 8
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. (creating 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(l)(A), § 2266(c)(1)(A)).
305. Id. (creating 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(l)(C)) (stating that the district court may
delay decision on a habeas corpus application for 30 days upon a finding that the ends of
justice served by such delay outweigh the interests of both the public and the applicant
in a speedy resolution).
306. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT AND PROPOSAL OF THE AD
Hoc COMMI-TFEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES (Sept. 6, 1989) (Justice
Powell chaired the ad hoc committee, which reviewed the state of habeas corpus in
capital cases).
307. See S. 735, § 607 (creating 28 U.S.C. § 2266). The Senate bill provides that
"[a] district court shall render a final determination and enter a final judgment on any
application for a writ of habeas corpus ... in a capital case not later than 180 days after
the date on which the application is filed." Id. (creating 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(l)(A)). An
appellate court shall render a final determination of an appeal of any order not later than
120 days after the date on which the reply brief or the answering brief is filed. Id.
(creating 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c)(l)(A)).
Section 607 further provides with regard to both the district courts and the courts of
appeals: "The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this
section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or
sentence." Id. (creating 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(4)(A), § 2266(c)(4)(A)).
308. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence not
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (describing
the inadequacies of lawyers in capital cases); The Death of Fairness? Counsel
Competency & Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOuS. L. REV. 1105, 1178-87
19961 563
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I don't want to minimize the significance of these capital habeas
corpus provisions, but I find more interesting the bill's first part, the
"general" habeas corpus "reform" package. 309 Examining that part of
the bill, you find what you might expect: an emphasis on speed and
finality. Everywhere you look, there is another provision that expe-
dites cases, cuts off claims, or terminates litigation. Although these
provisions would control both capital and non-capital cases, it's very
clear that the drafters have capital cases in mind.
For all federal habeas cases, the statute of limitations (the filing
deadline) would be one year after the conclusion of direct review.3,0
So even if a state doesn't provide post-conviction counsel, and thus,
doesn't get the benefit of the six-month filing limit in the second part
of the bill, the state would still get the benefit of a one-year filing
deadline in every federal habeas corpus case.
There would also be extremely restrictive rules on multiple petitions
from a single prisoner. 31 ' This is the subject of much rhetoric on the
floor of Congress. Habeas corpus is attacked not only as generating
delay, but also because of multiple petitions from the same prisoner.
This is very difficult to defend in political circles. Accordingly, the
Senate bill has draconian provisions regarding second and successive
petitions.
All of the above I would put under the heading of speeding up, and
fixing finality rules for, federal habeas litigation. Such provisions pre-
suppose that there will be federal habeas litigation, that the federal
courts will continue to have jurisdiction in these cases, and that they
will, in a proper procedural posture, decide the merits of habeas peti-
tions.
But there are other provisions in this general part of the Senate bill,
and also in the House bill, which concern the federal courts' ability to
adjudicate the merits. These are attacks on the integrity and indepen-
dence of the federal courts.
I will discuss three things under this heading. First, there's a pro-
vision on what a federal court should do when a state court has made a
factual finding regarding the prisoner's claim. Under existing law,
federal courts are told to presume the accuracy of a state court finding
(1994) (discussing the role of counsel in capital cases); Ira P. Robins, American Bar
Association, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 70 (1990) (discussing the poor performance of lawyers
handling post-conviction challenges in capital cases).
309. S. 735 §§ 601-606.
310. S. 735 § 601 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1994)).
311. S. 735 § 606(b) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1994)).
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of fact. 312 Although this would remain true under the Senate bill,3" 3
there are additional procedural safeguards under existing law. For in-
stance, under existing law, federal courts don't have to accept state
findings of fact unless the findings were made in the proper procedural
posture, and unless there was a written statement of the findings. 3t4
These and other safeguards regarding state court fact-finding must be
met before the federal court must presume that the state court's find-
ings are accurate. The Senate bill would eliminate these procedural
safeguards." 5
I don't know what the federal courts would do with that. Perhaps
they would read those procedural safeguards back into the mix, on the
theory that a federal court ought not be required to accept a finding
made by a state court without an opportunity to examine the procedural
machinery the state court used. Nevertheless, the Senate bill contem-
plates that a federal court would have to accept findings of fact made in
state court without examining the way in which the state court reached
those findings.
Second, there's a provision on evidentiary hearings in federal
court. 316 This is where most cases are won or lost. Most petitioners
need an evidentiary hearing to fill out the factual record supporting
their claims. Typically, if a petitioner cannot obtain an evidentiary
hearing in federal court, he is not able to expose the court to the mate-
rial facts of his case. This is where the action tends to be.
The drafters of this bill obviously want this provision to restrict a
prisoner's ability to get an evidentiary hearing in federal court. Under
existing law, a prisoner is entitled to a hearing if the prisoner's allega-
tions, if true, would entitle the prisoner to relief. 1 7 If there's a dispute
regarding those allegations of fact, a hearing is typically the only way
to resolve that dispute. It's also true, though, under existing Supreme
Court cases, that the usual rules regarding procedural default in state
court apply and limit the right to a mandatory federal evidentiary hear-
ing.318 So, if the prisoner fails to develop the material facts when
312. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994).
313. S. 735 § 604(4) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
314. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
315. S. 735 § 604(4)(e) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Section 604(4) provides:
"[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be
correct." Id.
316. Id.
317. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
3 18. Procedural default occurs when a litigant in a state proceeding fails to properly
raise or preserve an issue; this failure typically bars later review of that issue in the state
courts and, generally, in federal court as well. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
1996] 565
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given an opportunity to do so in state court, there often will be no op-
portunity to develop those material facts in federal court. The prisoner
won't be able to prove the facts in federal court unless he shows
"cause" for having defaulted in state court, or unless he can assert
some serious evidence linking his claim to factual innocence. 3 9 Thus
it's already pretty difficult to get an evidentiary hearing in federal
court. If you fail to take the proper steps in state court, you're very
likely to lose out in federal court.
The Senate habeas bill means to tighten this up considerably more.
Under the bill, if a prisoner fails to develop material facts in state
court, there can be no federal evidentiary hearing unless the prisoner
demonstrates a very good reason for having failed to do so, and the
prisoner links his claim with factual innocence.320 If you take this
provision literally, only prisoners who can show that they are actually
innocent will get evidentiary hearings. Under a literal reading, a fed-
eral court would be required to rule on the merits of a federal constitu-
tional claim in ignorance of the material facts, simply because those
facts weren't developed in state court. I tend to think that, at least in
some cases, this provision has to be unconstitutional in application.
Third, and most important, is the bill's so-called "deference" provi-
sion. 32  Those of us who worked in the Senate trying to defeat this
bill in its entirety focused primary attention here. Senator Biden intro-
duced an amendment that would have struck this provision from the
bill altogether.322 A good bit of work was done on that amendment,
which got forty-six votes in a losing cause. The provision remains in
the bill, and if we see legislation later in this Congress, I think this
provision will survive--even though there was great opposition to it
(1977). When federal courts refuse to review these cases, they do so because the state
procedural default constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for the decision.
See id. at 81-82, 84 (applying the "adequate and independent state ground" doctrine and
establishing that a prisoner can typically overcome procedural default only by showing
"cause" for the default and "prejudice").
3 19. See, e.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) ("[Alpplication of
the cause-and-prejudice standard to excuse a state prisoner's failure to develop material
facts in state court will appropriately accommodate concerns of finality, comity, judicial
economy, and channeling the resolution of claims into the most appropriate forum.");
see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) ("[A] showing that the factual or
legal basis for a claim [is] not reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some
interference by officials,' made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause ......
(citations omitted).
320. S. 735, § 604(4) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
321. S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 604(3) (1995) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
322. S. 735, Amendment No. 1224 to The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act
of 1995 (1995). See also 141 CONG. REC. S7840-45 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Biden).
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not only from Democrats, but also from many Republicans. Senator
Cohen from Maine took time from the Republican side and made a
very important speech in favor of the amendment that would have
deleted this provision from the bill.323
Under current federal habeas law, federal courts must, formally at
least, exercise independent judgment on the merits of federal constitu-
tional claims that have cleared all the procedural hurdles.324 The fed-
eral courts are not supposed to defer to what the state courts have done
previously on the merits. That's not to suggest that the federal courts
ignore state court determinations. They don't. But formally at least,
federal courts are to exercise independent judgment. That's been the
law at least since Brown v. Allen in 19 5 3 .32 By the way, that was not
a Warren Court holding; the principal opinion in Brown was written
by Felix Frankfurter.326
Under this bill, there would be a general rule that federal courts can-
not award relief on a claim that was previously rejected on the merits in
state court.327 So, the general rule under this provision would be pre-
cisely the opposite of existing law under Brown v. Allen.328 There
would be three exceptions in the Senate bill. The first exception would
be that if the state court judgment was contrary to clearly established
federal law, then the federal court could grant relief on the claim. 329
Second, a federal court could grant relief if the state court judgment
constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established law to the
facts of the particular case.33° And third, the federal court could grant
relief if the state court judgment rested on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts in light of the evidence.33'
I don't know what all this would mean. Looking literally at the
provision, I have the impression that the drafters want to restrict the
ability of federal courts to award relief with respect to claims that the
323. 141 CONG. REC. S7838-39 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
324. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994). This section states: "The court shall summarily hear
and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Id. See also
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2242 (1994) (delineating application requirements for a writ of
habeas corpus and authorizing the "Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts
and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions" to grant writs of habeas
corpus).
325. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 457-60 (1953) (holding that no binding weight
is to be attached to the state determination).
326. Id. at 446.
327. S. 735 § 604(3) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
328. Brown, 344 U.S. at 457-60.
329. S. 735 § 604(3) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
330. Id.
331. Id.
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federal courts think are meritorious. And the drafters want the federal
courts, in some fashion, to take greater account of what state courts
have done on claims. Just how much account is unclear.
Many federal courts might now say that they do not grant relief un-
less it is pretty clear that the state courts made a serious error and, for
example, acted contrary to clearly established federal law. I expect that
some federal courts would say that they wouldn't grant relief even
now on the basis of a claim the state courts rejected, unless there was
something unreasonable about what the state courts did in the particu-
lar case.
So, it's possible to come away with the impression that this might
not change things all that much. There was a lot of rhetoric to that ef-
fect on the floor of the Senate from the proponents of this. They said
it wouldn't be a serious intrusion into the independence of the federal
judiciary, that they don't mean to do away with federal habeas corpus,
that there still would be federal examination of the merits of habeas
claims, and that they just want the federal courts to lighten up a little.
But opponents saw this provision as very serious, indeed. I fear it
will be taken seriously and will restrict the ability of the federal courts
to determine the merits independently and to award relief on the basis
of meritorious constitutional claims.
Just speculating a moment on how this provision might be read, you
might think that what Congress is doing here is using its power to pre-
scribe the jurisdiction of the federal courts and is withdrawing. some of
the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. But I think that's probably not
what this does. Taken literally, it doesn't withdraw jurisdiction at all.
It leaves the existing jurisdictional statutes in place.
You might also think that it means to require that federal habeas
courts somehow have to give preclusive effect to previous state court
judgments. I think that's probably not the way it ought to be read, ei-
ther. After all, in previous bills in other years, habeas critics have
proposed that federal courts ought to be denied the power to award re-
lief on the merits of claims if those claims have been fully and fairly
adjudicated previously in state court. Although those bills used the
language of preclusion, this bill doesn't use the "full and fair adjudica-
tion" standard. So I think that something other than preclusion is
afoot.
It's anybody's guess just how much deference to the state courts the
federal courts would have to give. That would just have to be liti-
gated.
Thanks very much.
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RONALD J. TABAK
We are now going to hear from Stephen B. Bright, the Director of
the Southern Center for Human Rights,'in Atlanta. Steve has done
trailblazing work in trial courts and habeas corpus proceedings. My
law firm's fellowship program thinks so highly of his organization that
three people have gotten Skadden Fellowships to work at the Southern
Center for Human Rights. Steve has taught at Harvard and Yale Law
Schools. He's published many law review articles, and his upcoming
law review article concerns state court judges and the impact of judicial
elections.332 In light of what you've just heard about the deference the
state court judiciary would be given under the proposed federal habeas
law, his comments are particularly timely. Here is Steve Bright.
STEPHEN B. BRIGHT
The answer to the question posed for this panel is that there is not
much habeas left in this corpus. The U.S. Supreme Court under the
leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist has been whittling away at the
once great writ of habeas corpus since 1977. 333 Now Congress is
poised to finish it off. 334 The result is that the system by which people
are condemned to die in this country has less integrity and fairness.
But the state attorneys general and some members of Congress are
not satisfied to restrict the power of federal courts to protect the consti-
tutional rights of those facing loss of liberty or life. They want to deny
those facing the death penalty even the assistance of competent law-
332. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 759, 779 (1995).
333. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1713-14 (1993) (reducing
the harmless error standard for constitutional violations recognized in federal habeas
review); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8, 11-12 (1992) (making it more
difficult for petitioners to obtain an evidentiary hearing to prove a constitutional
violation); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490-95 (1991) (restricting when a
constitutional violation may be raised in a second habeas petition); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 294-96 (1989) (adopting an extremely restrictive doctrine regarding the
retroactivity of constitutional law); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-40 (1984)
(requiring deference to fact finding by state court judges); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 86-89 (1977) (adopting strict rules for procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 492-95 (1976) (excluding most Fourth Amendment claims from habeas corpus
review).
334. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, supra, at 561-68. See also David
Cole, Destruction of the Habeas Safety Net, LEGAL TIMES, June 19, 1995, at 30, 33
("[F]ederal courts under the new standard will not only have to determine that the state
courts erred in finding no constitutional violations, but will also have to find that the
state courts' decisions were 'unreasonable' or, in the Supreme Court's words, that the
courts were 'plainly incompetent."').
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yers. They are behind the removal of federal funding to the capital
post-conviction defender organizations, also known as death penalty
resource centers. 35 A committee of federal judges concluded that the
post-conviction defender offices were cost effective and enhanced the
quality of representation in capital cases.336 This recommendation did
not deter Congress from eliminating funding for the programs.337 The
closing of these small organizations, which have for the last eight
years done a heroic job of finding lawyers for the condemned and
providing direct representation to them, will be a lethal blow to what
little constitutional protections remain for those facing the executioner.
The Bill of Rights means nothing without lawyers. Taking away
the handful of specialists in capital post-conviction representation em-
ployed by the capital defender organizations on the theory that other
lawyers will respond to the legal needs of those under death sentences
is much like removing all of the doctors, nurses, and technicians from
Cook County Hospital and saying that poor people will still get medi-
cal care because there are plenty of doctors in Illinois.
The removal of funding for the capital representation centers tells us
that the attorneys general of many states and a majority in Congress do
not care at all about fairness or about due process. A few years ago,
the notion that we would allow people to be executed without legal
counsel was unthinkable. But now, it may very well happen.
Who will represent the condemned in post-conviction proceedings
in many states once there is no capital representation center? Our of-
fice, which receives no government support, is not able to take the
cases because we are already too overextended on the cases we have.
There is no mechanism in many states to provide lawyers for post-
conviction proceedings. And there is little or no compensation to at-
tract lawyers. Alabama pays a flat fee of $600 for representation in a
post-conviction capital case; Georgia, Mississippi, and many other
states pay nothing at all. Only a handful of lawyers are willing to take
on the pro bono representation of a death case. There are not enough
335. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Republicans Take Aim at Death Row Lawyers, NAT'L.
L.J., Sept. 18, 1995, at Al, A25 (describing the effort of South Carolina's Attorney
General and other members of the National Association of Attorneys General to
eliminate funding for the post-conviction defender organizations even though the
organizations had established the innocence of at least four men condemned to die).
336. DEFENDER SERVICES, supra note 46, at 6.
337. See David Cole, Too Expensive or Too Effective? The Real Reason the GOP
Wants to Cut Capital-Representation Centers, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Atlanta),
Sept. 8, 1995, at 6 (pointing out that eliminating funding for the capital representation
centers will actually increase the cost of providing representation, but decrease the
quality).
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pro bono lawyers for the 3,000 men, women, and children on death
row across the country.338
We will soon see whether the states will execute people without any
post-conviction review if no lawyer volunteers to represent them.
More likely, many states will take the same approach to providing
lawyers at the post-conviction stages that they take at trial: cases will
be assigned to unqualified lawyers who will be paid a token fee to
provide perfunctory representation.339
Habeas corpus has been restricted by the Supreme Court in large
part because of interests of federalism and comity-that is, to maintain
good relations between the state and federal courts. 34 0 The federal
courts are already required to defer to findings of fact by the state
courts. 34 ' The habeas corpus provisions passed by the Senate this
summer would require deference even to the legal conclusions of state
court judges.342
The argument is made that because state court judges take the same
oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States as federal judges,
state court judges will enforce the law.343 However, in thirty-two of
the thirty-eight states that have the death penalty, state court judges
must stand for periodic election or retention.344 For most of those
338. DEATH Row USA, supra note 46, at 1.
339. See Bright, supra note 308, at 1835 (describing numerous examples of poor
representation in capital cases); Robins, supra note 308, at 16 (finding "inadequacy and
inadequate compensation of counsel at trial" to be one of the "principal failings of the
capital punishment review process today").
340. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) ("This is a case
about federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts owe the States and the
States' procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas
corpus.").
341. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (providing that a determination of a state court of
competent jurisdiction "shall be presumed to be correct" unless petitioner demonstrates
that those findings are erroneous).
342. See S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 604(3) (1995) (amending 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)) (requiring deference by federal courts to decisions of state courts unless the
decision is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States").
343. E.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981) ("State judges as well as federal
judges swear allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and there is no reason
to think that because of their frequent differences of opinions as to how that document
should be interpreted, all are not doing their mortal best to discharge their oath of
office.").
344. The following states have capital punishment statutes: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See Bright &
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judges, granting relief in a death penalty case is tantamount to signing
their own political death warrants.
In 1986, the governor of California, George Deukmejian, warned
two justices of the state supreme court that if they did not change their
votes in death penalty cases, he would oppose their retention and have
them voted off the court.345 He had already announced his opposition
to Chief Justice Rose Bird because of her votes in capital cases.346
The governor apparently concluded that the justices did not bend to
this improper effort to influence them, and he carried out his threat.347
All three justices were voted off the court.348 Deukmejian appointed
their successors in 1987. 349
The voters got what they wanted in terms of results-plenty of
death penalty affirmances. But it is doubtful whether they are getting
justice from a court that has become a death mill. The California
Supreme Court, which was once one of the great courts in this land, is
now known primarily for its refinement of the harmless error doc-
trine .350 The court is much like the soldiers who were called onto the
battlefield after the battle to shoot the wounded. It has the highest af-
firmance rate of any state supreme court in the country in capital
cases.
35 1
What happened in California is happening in other states as well.
There was an election last year for the Texas Court of Criminal
Keenan, supra note 332, at 779 n.88. Of these states, Connecticut, Delaware, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia do not employ periodic elections
for judicial selection or retention. Id.
345. Steve Wiegand, Governor's Warning to 2 Justices, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 14,
1986, at 1.
346. Leo C. Wolinsky, Support for Two Justices Tied to Death Penalty Votes,
Governor Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1986, at 3 ("Bird has voted to strike down every
death penalty case that has gone before the court.").
347. Henry Unger, Will Vote Against Grodin, Reynoso, Deukmejian Says, L.A.
DAILY J., Aug. 26, 1986, at I.
348. Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1986, at I (describing the results of the election and commercials in the last month of
the campaign which insisted "that all three justices needed to lose if the death penalty is
to be enforced").
349. Id.
350. See Elliot C. Kessler, Death and Harmlessness: Application of the Harmless
Error Rule by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty Cases-A Comparison &
Critique, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 41, 84-5, 89 (1991) (observing that the Lucas Court has
"reversed every premise underlying the Bird Court's harmless error analysis," displaying
an eagerness to find error harmless that reflects "jurisprudential theory" less than a
"desire to carry out the death penalty").
351. Maura Dolan, State High Court Is Strong Enforcer of Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1995, at AI ("During the past five years, the California Supreme Court has
affirmed nearly 97% of the capital cases it reviewed.").
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Appeals. Stephen W. Mansfield ran for a seat on the court on a three-
plank platform: greater use of the death penalty, greater use of the
harmless error doctrine, and fines for lawyers who file "frivolous ap-
peals" in death penalty cases.352 Mansfield challenged an incumbent, a
former prosecutor, who had served for twelve years on the court.35 3
Before the election, it was revealed that Mansfield had been a member
of the Texas bar for only a couple of years, that he had been fined for
practicing law without a license in Florida, and that he had almost no
criminal law experience.354 Nevertheless, Mansfield won the election.
The Texas Lawyer aptly described him after his election as an
"unqualified success. 355
Justice James Robertson was voted off the Mississippi Supreme
Court in 1992.356 He was the second judge in just two years to be
voted off the court for being "soft on crime. 357
The attorney general of Georgia, Michael Bowers, has already
served notice that the new Chief Justice of Georgia, Robert Benham,
may be targeted in the election next year because of Justice Benham's
votes in death penalty cases.358 Chief Justice Benham is vulnerable
because he is the first African American member of the Georgia
Supreme Court. 3 59 But no one will talk about race; Benham will be
attacked based on the death penalty.
Georgia's attorney general has asserted that the Georgia Supreme
Court is the "most liberal" supreme court in the country.36 ° If that
were true it would be front page news in the New York Times. The
352. Janet Elliott & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate; His Past
Isn't What it Seems, TEX. LAW., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1, 32.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Jane Elliott, Unqualified Success: Mansfield's Mandate; Vote Makes Case for
Merit Selection, TEX. LAW., Nov. 14, 1994, at 1.
356. David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial
Elections in Mississippi, 13 Miss. C. L. REV. I, 15-20 (1992) (demonstrating the evils
of mixing politics and judicial selection by examining the downfall of Justice James
Robertson).
357. Andy Kanenglser, McRae Overwhelms Justice Joel Blass, CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), June 6, 1990, at 4A.
358. See Peter Mantius, Speaking His Mind: A Decision that Robert Behnam Wrote
Last Year Could Bring Conservative Opposition at the Polls. New Chief Justice Is
Prudent Pioneer but Benham Doesn't Duck Controversies, ATLANTA CONST., July 3,
1995, at B2 (Attorney General Bowers advised that "[any time you start making
controversial decisions, it opens you to a greater extent" to political opposition).
359. Id.
360. Bill Shipp, The State Scene: Benham and the Rare High Court Fuss, MONROE
COUNTY REC. (Ga.), Apr. 5, 1995, at 4 (opinion column syndicated in Georgia
newspapers).
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attorney general has also accused Chief Justice Benham of leading a
campaign to abolish the death penalty in Georgia.3 6' But Chief Justice
Benham has voted to affirm in two-thirds of the death penalty cases.
Voting to affirm in two-thirds of the cases would be a remarkable way
to abolish the death penalty.362 But that kind of distortion takes place
in judicial campaigns.
In Mississippi, Justice James Robertson was attacked during the
campaign for a concurring opinion in which he said the death penalty
could not be imposed in a rape case where the victim was not killed.363
In making this observation, Justice Robertson was simply following,
as he was required to do, the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia.364 Yet he was portrayed as a jurist who
did not favor the death penalty for someone who had raped a minor.
Robertson's opponent also claimed that Robertson did not think the
death penalty was appropriate for someone who murdered a pizza-de-
livery boy.365 This claim was based on a dissenting opinion authored
by Robertson, in which he expressed the view that an aggravating cir-
cumstance was unconstitutionally vague.366 Robertson's position was
later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the
Mississippi Supreme Court's decision.367
Not only have justices and judges been targeted for their votes, but
there have been serious political consequences for their supporters as
well. Bill Frist was elected to the U.S. Senate from Tennessee in part
by campaigning against the federal judiciary. He criticized Senator Jim
Sasser for having voted to confirm Rosemary Barkett, the Chief
Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, for the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.3 6 The Frist campaign ran an advertisement in
361. Id.
362. See Mantius, supra note 358, at B2 (stating that Justice Benham noted "that he
has voted for the death penalty about five times for every vote he has cast against it").
363. On March 10, Vote for Judge James L Roberts, Jr. for The Mississippi Supreme
Court, campaign supplement to the N.E. Miss. DAILY J., Mar. 7, 1992, at 6 (criticizing
Robertson's opinion in Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 403-06 (Miss. 1989)
(Robertson, J., concurring), as "morally repugnant").
364. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional in rape
cases where no death occurs).
365. See Case, supra note 356, at 18.
366. Clemons v. State, 535 So. 2d 1354, 1367 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J.,
dissenting) ("The Cartwright error is that the phrase 'especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel' is unconstitutionally vague, so that a death sentence relying upon an aggravating
circumstance so phrased may not stand."), vacated sub norn. Clemons v. Mississippi,
494 U.S. 738 (1990).
367. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 738.
368. Political Notebook, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 8, 1994, at B3.
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which the sister of a murder victim criticized Sasser for recommending
the appointment of U.S. District Judge John Nixon, who had granted
habeas corpus relief to the person convicted of killing her sister.369
Frist said that Sasser's vote to confirm Barkett showed that he "still
hasn't learned his lesson. 370
Many state court judges come on the bench from the prosecutors'
offices.37' Many of them became judges by prosecuting high-profile
death penalty cases, getting the publicity, getting the public attention,
and then going to the bench. Unfortunately, many continue to use the
death penalty for political purposes on the bench.
Bob Austin, a district court judge in Alabama, was specially desig-
nated to preside over a capital case which was to be tried two weeks
before the election in which Austin was on the ballot running for a
higher court, the circuit court, as the Democratic candidate against the
Republican, a former United States Attorney for the Northern District
of Alabama. 72 How fair can a judge be in those circumstances?
There was a motion for a change of venue before him.373 If he granted
the change of venue he would be saying to the people who might vote
for him in two weeks that they could not be fair. There was a motion
for a continuance because the lead defense lawyer was suffering from
an infection, a complication of polio.3 74 If the judge continued the case
until after the election, he would lose the daily front-page coverage
which would undoubtedly help him in the election. There was a mo-
tion to suppress a statement.375 What would happen if two weeks be-
fore the election the judge were to suppress a statement? Suddenly,
the great political benefit of this capital trial would turn into a liability.
Needless to say, the motion for a change of venue was denied, the
motion for a continuance was denied, and the statement was not sup-
pressed.376 The case went to trial, the defendant was sentenced to
death and Judge Austin won the election.377
Lawyers in Louisville, Kentucky were surprised to find, when they
came to court for an arraignment in a death penalty case in which an
African American defendant was accused of murdering a deputy sher-
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Bright & Keenan, supra note 332, at 781-84.
372. Id. at 787-88.
373. Id. at 788 n.147.
374. Id. at 788.
375. Id. at 788 n.146.
376. Id. at 788 nn. 146-47.
377. Id. at 788-89.
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iff, that a lower court judge, Jim Shake, was going to preside instead
of the judge to whom the case had been assigned. 378 The judge to
whom the case had originally been assigned explained to counsel in
chambers that Shake was presiding because "Jim's on the ballot
Tuesday."379
A circuit judge in Alabama campaigned for re-election to the bench
by running newspaper advertisements that proclaimed: "Some com-
plain that he's too tough on criminals, AND HE IS .... We need
him now more than ever., 380 But the constitutional duty of a judge is
"to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the ac-
cused., 38 ' How can a judge who runs on a platform of being "too
tough" on one group of litigants possibly be fair?
The judges who obtain office in this manner are responsible for the
sad state of indigent defense in most states. Judges appoint the
lawyers who defend the accused and decide whether to give the de-
fense funds for investigative or expert assistance. There is no public
defender office in many states, including most of those which sentence
the most people to death.382
Judges in Houston, Texas, have repeatedly appointed a lawyer to
defend capital and other criminal cases even though he occasionally
sleeps during some of the trials.383 Ten of his clients have been sen-
tenced to death.3 4 One judge in Houston, in response to a defendant's
complaint that his lawyer was sleeping during the trial, said that the
Constitution may guarantee a lawyer, but it "doesn't say the lawyer
378. Id. at 787.
379. Id. (quoting Motion to Disqualify Present and Former Members of Jefferson
Circuit Court and Jefferson District Court and to Obtain Appointment of a Special Judge
from Outside Jefferson County 3-4, Commonwealth v. Bard, No. 93CR2373 (Ky. Cir.
Ct. Jefferson County Nov. 9, 1993)).
380. The advertisement appeared in the BIRMINGHAM NEWS on Nov. 4, 1994, at 4C,
and on Nov. 6, 1994, at 21P.
381. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). The Court held that it is a denial of
due process to subject a defendant to a criminal trial where the judge has a direct,
personal, and substantial interest in conviction. Id. at 535.
382. Bright, supra note 308, at 1849-52. Of the 36 states which have the death
penalty, only 11 have statewide public defender offices: California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, and Wyoming. Id. at 1849 n.79.
383. Paul M. Barrett, Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About
System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at Al. The lawyer, Joe Frank Cannon, "boasts of
hurrying through trials 'like greased lightning,"' without making any objections; his
approach is described by others as "a mockery of the adversary process." Id. Not only
has Mr. Cannon made legal mistakes in his defense work, but he has also been accused of
falling asleep in court. Id. at A6.
384. Id.
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has to be awake." '385 This tells us something about how seriously
some judges take their oaths.
An attorney in Georgia secured an acquittal for Robert Wallace at his
retrial. Wallace had previously been convicted and sentenced to death,
but the United States Court of Appeals granted habeas corpus relief
because Wallace had been sentenced to death in violation of the
Constitution.3 6 The lawyer who defended Wallace successfully at the
retrial told me recently that he has never been appointed to defend an-
other indigent case by the judges in that circuit.
Judges in Alabama, Texas, and many other states routinely abdicate
their judicial responsibilities and allow the attorney general's office to
write the orders resolving issues in capital cases.387 In one Georgia
case, it was discovered that the judge had signed off on an order in a
capital case which discussed the testimony of a witness who had never
appeared before him in the case.388 It turned out that the order came
off the attorney general's word processor and described the witness
who had never appeared before the judge. 389 The judge paid so little
attention to that order that he still signed it.390  Nevertheless, the
Georgia Supreme Court upheld the order, even though the judge made
credibility findings about a witness who never appeared. 39'
Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court has
pointed out the tendency of elected judges to override jury sentences of
life imprisonment and impose the death penalty in states where that
practice is allowed.3 92 Alabama judges have overridden jury sentences
of life imprisonment without parole and imposed the death penalty
forty-seven times, but have rejected only five sentences of death and
imposed life imprisonment without parole.393 Between 1972 and early
385. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job; Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Said, HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35.
386. Wallace v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102, 1112 (11 th Cir. 1985) (holding that because
Wallace was mentally incompetent at the time of his first trial, his conviction violated
due process).
387. Bright & Keenan, supra note 332, at 803-11.
388. See Jefferson v. Zant, 431 S.E.2d 110, 111-12 (Ga. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1577 (1994).
389. Id. at 111-12 (noting the State's concession that it drafted the final order at the
court's request and mistakenly referred to an attorney who did not testify).
390. Id. at 112 (noting that the judge adopted the order that was drafted by the State
"as his own").
391. Id.
392. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1038 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and indiana, which permit a judge to override a
jury's recommendation of sentence).
393. See id. at 1040 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1992, Florida trial judges rejected jury sentences of life imprisonment
and imposed death 134 times, but overrode only fifty-one death rec-
ommendations and imposed sentences of life imprisonment.394 As
Justice Stevens has observed, the only explanation for these discrepan-
cies appears to be "a political climate in which judges who covet higher
office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must constantly pro-
fess their fealty to the death penalty."'3 95
Most judges do not need a warning like Governor Deukmejian gave
the justices in California.396 Most know the political realities already.
One reason there is such great admiration for courageous judges like J.
Skelly Wright, Frank Johnson, and Elbert Tuttle who did not bend to
the passions of the moment, is that there are so few of them. 397 But
most judges care more about retaining their office and getting their
pensions than they do about enforcing the Bill of Rights for someone
who is hated by the entire community.
This means that the Constitution of the United States is not funda-
mental law. If its protections may be ignored by judges who are intim-
idated by the political winds of the moment, or may be repealed by a
majority of the voters in any county by voting a judge out of office,
then the Constitution is not the basic, fundamental law of our nation.
Greater deference to the rulings of state court judges and less
scrutiny by life-tenured federal judges, as provided in the bill that
passed the Senate,398 will only lessen adherence to the rule of the law
and the Constitution in capital cases. Instead of engaging in wishful
thinking about the independence of elected judges and indulging in
legal fictions of impartiality, Congress and the courts should be realis-
tic about the political pressures that influence elected judges. Instead
of greater deference to the fact findings and legal conclusions of state
court judges, the discretion of elected judges should be restricted, and
reviewing courts should not defer to their findings. It is preposterous
to pretend that judges are wisely exercising their discretion or making
credibility findings when it is obvious that their decisions are politi-
cally motivated.
394. Id. at 1040 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Michael L. Radelet & Michael
Mello, Death-to-Life Overrides: Saving the Resources of the Florida Supreme Court, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 196, 210-11 (1992)).
395. Id. at 1039 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
396. See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
397. Judges Wright, Johnson and Tuttle were all federal judges who enjoyed life
tenure, and thus remained in office despite the courageous and controversial decisions
that they made.
398. See supra notes 312-31 and accompanying text.
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What can be done? The increasing political pressures on the courts
make imperative reforms in judicial selection systems so that judges
are not forced to decide between personal political considerations and
the law. But there is little likelihood of such reforms being adopted.
The standing of the judiciary in many states has been substantially di-
minished because of unseemly and irresponsible campaigns such as I
have described here, and by suspect contributions from special interest
groups. Yet there has been no reform. However, so long as political
pressures continue to be so prominent, judges have a duty to recuse
themselves in cases where they know that a ruling could result in being
voted off the bench in the next election.
Tumey v. Ohio399 involved a mayor who presided as a judicial offi-
cer over cases in which his salary depended on the fines he collected
from the people coming before him. The Supreme Court held that vio-
lated due process because "[e]very procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge.., not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies
the latter due process of law." 4°° A far greater temptation not to hold
the balance "nice, clear and true" than was presented in Tumey exists
when a judge knows that if she grants a motion to suppress, the prose-
cutor is going to use it to run against her in the next election.
But despite the clear constitutional duty to step aside, most judges
do not do so. However, reviewing courts, including federal courts on
habeas corpus review, have a duty to recognize the lack of fairness and
impartiality of judges subject to political pressures.
In addition, judges should not be in the business of appointing
lawyers to defend indigent persons accused of crime. In many juris-
dictions, such as Philadelphia, the appointment of counsel has been a
political patronage system for the judges.4°' A study of capital cases in
Philadelphia found that "Philadelphia's poor defendants often find
themselves being represented by ward leaders, ward committeemen,
failed politicians, the sons of judges and party leaders, and contribu-
tors to the judges' election campaigns. ' 4 2 Not surprisingly, "even
officials in charge of the system say they wouldn't want to be repre-
sented in Traffic Court by some of the people appointed to defend poor
people accused of murder.'' 4 3
399. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
400. Id. at 532..
401. Fredric N. Tuisky, Big-Time Trials, Small-Time Defenses, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1992, at Al, A8.
402. Id.
403. Id. at A8.
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The judicial function and the defense function should be indepen-
dent of each other. How can a lawyer protect the client from abuses
by the judge if the lawyer's primary loyalty is to the judge in order to
get future appointments? Earlier proposals to restrict habeas corpus
review carried with them the requirement that states create an inde-
pendent authority for the appointment of counsel in capital cases.404
This brings us back to the need for meaningful habeas corpus re-
view in the federal courts. So long as state court judges must keep one
eye on the next election and are under a constant temptation to wink at
the Constitution, and so long as judges appoint lawyers who do not
zealously and effectively represent their clients, the state criminal jus-
tice systems lack essential elements for the fair, reliable, and constitu-
tional adjudication of cases. Even the most thorough federal habeas
corpus review will not correct every injustice that occurs in such cor-
rupt systems, but it can provide a remedy for some unjust convictions
and sentences. The great need today is not for further restrictions on
habeas corpus, but to restore habeas corpus to the role it once had in
the vindication of the Bill of Rights.
RONALD J. TABAK
Thank you very much, Steve. Steve spoke, near the end of his talk,
about the role of trial lawyers. You are now going to hear more about
trial lawyers from Scharlette Holdman, who is legendary for her work
in gathering mitigation evidence and all other kinds of evidence in capi-
tal cases, and in working with the human beings who are on our death
rows. She is currently at the California Appellate Project, one of the
resource centers that's facing the loss of its federal funding.
Scharlette first became involved with capital cases in Louisiana.
She then was the Director of the Florida Clearinghouse for Criminal
Justice. Her efforts there helped lead to the creation of the first state-
funded resource center in capital cases. She went on to South Carolina
before joining the California Appellate Project. She is a Ph.D. gradu-
ate in Cultural Anthropology from the University of Hawaii. She has
received numerous awards but you will receive the best award because
you are going to get to hear her speak. Here is Scharlette Holdman.
404. See H.R. 4737, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., at 9-12 (1990); Robins, supra note 308,
at 9-10, 18-19.
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SCHARLETTE HOLDMAN
I look out and recognize a few of you. You are representing some
of the nation's 3,000 condemned on death row across the country, °5
and I thank each of you personally.
There are difficult days ahead for all of us. Habeas has been the one
way that we could open the door to justice for people routinely denied
justice. I fear what the coming days will bring. I fear the hours and
hours of painstaking reconstruction work that we've done to develop
evidence of the denial of defendants' rights will all be for naught under
the new habeas legislation. 406 Frankly, I haven't had the courage to go
to death row and talk to anyone about it, although I've been to death
row twice over the last week. I just can't find in my heart the words to
tell them what's happening in Congress. Remember Justice Brennan's
dissent, where he talked about the attorney of a client possibly facing
the death penalty who has the horrible responsibility to tell the client
that none of those issues matter?4°7 I feel that same way. I'm at a loss
how to tell the people that we're working for what Congress is doing.
I first began to think about the death penalty in 1974, when I was
Director of the Louisiana ACLU. One of the folks on death row there
sent us a letter that said, "Would you please come and see us? We
heard that the death penalty was declared unconstitutional a couple of
years ago and that we shouldn't be here." So, I went up to death row
with a wonderful attorney, Leonard Dreyfuss. They brought out a
man, shackled, kind of trussed up like a turkey. I had never seen any-
one shackled like that. I remember being embarrassed to see someone
in chains. It's very much like seeing someone naked. It was very
difficult for me to look at him, so I tried to pretend that he was naked
and just looked in his eyes as he explained that there were no attor-
neys, and that the men on death row didn't know how to proceed and
wanted to know if I could help them. The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund sent me down some two-page forms which we typed up and
took back to death row, where most of the guys "X'd" them; they
couldn't read or write. We filed those pro per writs for the approxi-
mately eight guys on death row, and within a week their death sen-
tences were vacated and life sentences were imposed because, in 1972,
405. See Scott Pendleton, Legal Aid in Lone Star State: Who Will Pay Now for
Death-Row Appeals?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 1995, at 3.
406. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, supra, at 561-68 (describing the new
habeas legislation and discussing its potential ramifications on capital and non-capital
habeas cases).
407. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 321 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the death penalty had been declared unconstitutional in Furman v.
Georgia.4  We're returning to those days, where death row inmates
had no counsel.
In Florida, in the late 1970s, we recruited two pro bono attorneys,
Eleanor Jackson Piel, a wonderful attorney out of New York City, and
Howardene Garrett, a local public defender who worked in her off-
hours to represent two brothers on death row who ultimately were
freed because they were innocent. After spending eight years on death
row, Jent and Miller had a new trial ordered by the Eleventh Circuit.
After their case was sent back down, the local D.A. didn't know what
to do with the case, so he agreed to allow the brothers to enter a guilty
plea to second degree murder and to let them go home the same day.41 °
So, the brothers were freed after eight years on death row. We had a
small celebration at the pro bono attorney's home. It was a wonderful
day of celebration. A reporter there asked one of the brothers, "Don't
you think that this shows that justice works?" He replied, "Well, you
know, it's a funny thing. Eight years ago we said we were innocent
and they put us on death row. Now, yesterday, we said we were
guilty and they freed us. ' 4
1
As Steve Bright said last year in the Yale Law Journal, the death
penalty is imposed not upon those who commit the worst crimes, but
upon those who are represented by the worst appointed attorneys.41 2 I
want to talk to you about that, using examples from the Western states,
because intolerable representation occurs not just in cases in the South
where most of my work has been, but throughout the country.
I've divided into three categories the continuing role that the corrup-
tion of justice plays in the administration of death: cases where the
death sentence has been imposed (1) based on race, (2) due to ineffec-
408. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding that the death penalty, as imposed by the then-
existing Georgia scheme, was "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
409. Miller v. Dugger, 820 F.2d 1135, 1137 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that due
process required a new trial in light of new information that developed, such as different
versions of facts, recanted testimony, and "other questionable circumstances").
410. See Half-Brothers Serving Murder Term Freed After Lesser Plea, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
16, 1988, at 25 (describing the court proceedings that led to the brothers' release);
Athelia Knight, Pair Freed After Years on Death Row; Half-Brothers Once Neared
Execution, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1988, at A3 (same).
411. Jan Glidewell, Bruce Young's Blame-Free Ride Series, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Feb. 15, 1995, at 2B (opining that "[t]he only time I have ever seen a justifiable case of
a bogus plea was when [Jent and Miller] ... plead guilty").
412. See Bright, supra note 308, at 1836 (stating that "[iut is not the facts of the
crime, but the quality of legal representation, that distinguishes . . . where the death
penalty was imposed, from ... where it was not") (footnotes omitted).
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tive assistance of counsel, and (3) because of deteriorating or poor re-
lationships between the client and the court-appointed attorney.
They're all interrelated, but I'll try to separate them to give you a few
examples. With one exception, the California Supreme Court has af-
firmed in every California case I'm going to talk about, and we are in
various stages of federal court review.
I'm not going to tell you the names of clients, because we have
found through the years that when we put a spotlight on a client, the
client is moved to the front, and repercussions follow, and that the
government system of selecting out who to kill speeds up and focuses
on our client. So, I promised all of the attorneys, as I've collected
these vignettes for you, that I would not reveal the name or the county.
But these are cases currently pending in the Western states.
I'll start with a very simple little case, involving a man who was
scheduled to be executed and was saved within hours of execution.
His case is now pending in the Ninth Circuit. He is a farm worker,
born to a Mexican immigrant family in Arizona. He was tried by an
all-white jury. His defense attorney at trial called him a "wetback."
That slur was picked up and reiterated by all the other attorneys in the
case, with the excuse that the defense attorney started it.
Another case involves an African American defendant. I can men-
tion this case's name because it's reported: Wade v. Calderon.413 The
defense attorney in closing argument asked the jury to give his client
the death penalty, saying "Melvin... (referring to the defendant) can't
live with that beast from within any longer and if in your wisdom you
think the appropriate punishment is death, you may also be giving...
the gift of life." '414
Race plays a particular role in this country. It is the ugliest part of
the American spirit, but it is a vital part of the American spirit, whether
we are in Alabama, Mississippi, Miami, Louisiana, or South Central
Los Angeles. In Los Angeles County, whose cultural diversity makes
it a wonderfully exciting place to live, somehow out of the 119 people
selected for death from its twelve million residents, fifty-five percent
are African American.41 5 If you add in the Latinos, seventy-five per
413. 29 F.3d 1312, 1325 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding defendant's death sentence invalid
due to defense counsel's ineffective assistance during several portions of the trial), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
414. Id. at 1324.
415. This data was collected by the California Appellate Project in San Francisco,
California.
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cent of the people on California's death row from Los Angeles County
are people of color.416
They are often tried by all-white juries. You will not see an O.J.
Simpson-type jury for these poor black kids who are eighteen, nine-
teen, twenty years old and are being tried and sentenced to death. Gil
Garcetti, the District Attorney for Los Angeles County, knew that ev-
ery camera in the country and around the world was going to be
trained on the courtroom for the O.J. Simpson trial. He guaranteed
there would be African Americans on that jury because the community
was watching. Therefore, he transferred O.J.'s case from Brentwood
to the Central District, which is downtown; that guaranteed a majority
black jury.4 17
Garcetti did not do that for Jim, a nineteen-year-old African
American whom the police pulled over because, they said, they "could
tell that he was acting crazy." Jim was tried by an all-white jury and
sentenced to death for killing a police officer, whose last words were
"I've got a duster"-a reference to someone high on angel dust.
A twenty-year-old African American was also sentenced to death by
an all-white jury in Los Angeles County. He had met in a car with a
man who'd come into the community to purchase a prostitute and
drugs. They were supposed to make an exchange and a deal, but a
struggle erupted and the outsider was fatally shot.
Los Angeles County has a very complex system of jury selection,
called bull's eye, a targeting system. What they're trying to accom-
plish is that no juror travels more than twenty miles to serve. That
sounds pretty good, except that it results in the African Americans
who've moved away from the central city forming kind of a doughnut
around the central city. In this bull's eye system, those African
Americans are pulled into other cases and away from the cases where
the defendants are African Americans.
We continue to find African Americans and Latinos tried by all-
white juries not just in Los Angeles, but also in smaller towns, all
across the State of California. A Latino was tried by an all-white jury
in one of the few death penalty cases in recent years in which the
California Supreme Court granted relief. However, it only ordered a
new penalty phase proceeding, whereas it should have granted him a
416. Id.
417. See Mark Katches & Rick Orlov, Garcetti's Judgment Questioned; Experts Say
Simpson Tried in Wrong Court, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 9, 1995, at NI (reporting-
criticism regarding District Attorney Garcetti's filing of Simpson's case in downtown
Los Angeles and suggesting that the transfer from Brentwood to downtown was based on
Garcetti's political concerns).
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new guilt-innocence trial, too. Seventeen alibi witnesses were pre-
vented from testifying. The defendant's trial attorney claimed he could
communicate adequately with the client because the attorney had a
master's in Spanish from UCLA. But when his attorneys investi-
gated, they found that he didn't have that degree. Trial counsel then
said, "I went there under an assumed name because I was working
undercover for the U.S. Navy." We then checked with the Navy; he
wasn't working undercover with the Navy.
In this same case, on the second day of jury selection, this trial
counsel was arrested for DUI while driving to the courthouse, and had
a blood alcohol content of .27. The State Supreme Court said that no
prejudice bearing on the guilt phase was shown; the fact that he was
drunk didn't make him a bad lawyer. So what, whether he was drunk
or sober?
In a really sad, sad case, an old, mentally ill man went to evict ten-
ants from his home. A dispute erupted and he shot the tenants, killing
them. He retained an attorney to represent him. The attorney died.
The attorney's partner had the mentally ill man sign a forged quitclaim
deed transferring his house to the partner. The partner then proceeded
to represent the client at a competency hearing. Although the client is
mentally ill, is psychotic at times, has delusions, and goes without
eating or bathing, the partner said the client was competent. The part-
ner couldn't say the client was incompetent because the partner had
just convinced the client to sign over his home to the partner.
As Ron[ald J. Tabak] has often said, and as those of us in this work
understand, anywhere from fifty to seventy percent of our clients who
are offered pleas decline to take those pleas. I want to tell you one
quick example of why, from a case we won in federal district court
thanks to a wonderful attorney. The client was very, very hesitant
ever to trust us. He was nineteen years old, and had been living for
six months on the beach in San Diego under the walkway, under the
ferris wheel and the rides, living off of whatever he could scrape to-
gether out of garbage cans and whatever drugs other druggies would
hand him. He had never been in serious trouble before. (He had once
broken into a dry cleaner and stolen twenty dollars, which he took
back home to his father to try to save the family house from foreclo-
sure.)
This kid was arrested and jailed after he and four other kids shot an
assailant one night. His father, an abuser, retained a local lawyer who
had previously represented the father in divorce proceedings but was
not familiar with the father's abuse history. The local lawyer decided
to take the case because, in his words, "It would be a thrill," and he
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was a real thrill seeker. It would be quite a challenge to get involved in
a capital case, since he had never represented anyone capitally charged
before. So, he accepted the appointment to handle the case. But he
didn't go see his client.
In California, no bail will be set when you are assigned special cir-
cumstances in a capital case. But this lawyer didn't know that, or
didn't care. He had his secretary send a form letter to the nineteen-
year-old kid sitting in the local jail, telling him that once he got bail or
was released on his own recognizance, to please stop by and see the
attorney so that they could make future plans for how to proceed. This
kid continued to get baffling letters from the attorney for a couple of
months.
Finally, the attorney went to the jailed client and said, "Listen, I've
got a great deal for you. Plead guilty to life, but the deal is only open
until pre-trial motions are filed." The kid, having never seen his
attorney-having merely received letters telling him to drop by the of-
fice once he's released on bail-declined the plea. The attorney sent
his investigator in to document that the plea had been declined. But it
became clear to the investigator that the kid did not understand the na-
ture of the plea or that he had only a certain amount of time during
which he could plead to life rather than go to trial and risk getting a
sentence of death. The investigator did a good job documenting the
client's confession. By then, the defense attorney recognized that he
was in a little bit of trouble, so he sent in the abusive father to try to
talk the kid into taking the plea. The kid agreed to take the plea, but
the deal was no longer open. Now, a couple of million dollars and ten
years later, new counsel convinced the kid to agree to a plea of a life
sentence.
I don't know how to find the resources, the energy, the spirit and
the community to support the work that we have to do in the coming
days to protect the lives of those on death row. I look to you for your
support. We have done it before. I suppose we can try and do it
again. The last ten years of having funding have enabled us to save
the lives of so many people whose lives otherwise wouldn't have been
saved. For those of us who have buried people as well as gone to
parties to celebrate the release of the innocent, I know which activity
I'd rather do. But I think there is going to be a lot more of the former
and far less of the latter.
RONALD J. TABAK
Thank you very much, Scharlette. As Scharlette just said, the exis-
tence of the federally funded resource centers has been a major reason
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why so many people who have been sentenced to death or convicted in
violation of the Constitution in what was not harmless error have not
been executed. We have with us today the Director of the Illinois
Capital Resource Center, Andrea Lyon. Before joining the center,
Andrea spent over fourteen years in the office of the Cook County
Public Defender, where she supervised a twenty-two lawyer unit and
personally tried over 100 homicide cases. She has lectured on death
penalty issues at the University of Michigan School of Law, where she
is about to teach on a permanent basis, Harvard, the University of
Chicago, and other schools. She wrote the Illinois Death Penalty
Defense Manual4 8 and has written extensively elsewhere. She serves
on the board of directors of the Women's Bar Association of Illinois
and as Vice President of the Illinois Attorneys for Criminal Justice. It
will be a severe loss for the death row inmates of Illinois when she is
not here on a day-to-day basis, but she is committed to continuing this
work, although based in Michigan. She is here to tell you about the
role of the federal resource centers in habeas corpus matters and what
it will mean to have them defunded. Here is Andrea Lyon.
ANDREA LYON
I want to talk to you about what resource centers do and compare
what collateral representation used to be like before there was an or-
ganized way of approaching it. I don't know how many of you have
ever filed or seen a post-conviction petition in state court, but what
they used to be like was basically this: "Dear Judge, my name is
Defendant. I've been convicted and I wish I wasn't. I am sure there
is something unconstitutional about it. Love, the Defendant." Often,
I am sorry to report, that is what a federal habeas corpus petition
looked like as well. That's because people didn't know how to litigate
these things, and there was no organized way to learn how to litigate
them.
The Cox Subcommittee on Death Penalty Representation presented a
report regarding the beleaguered, unpopular, politically assailed re-
source centers at the Judicial Conference of the United States in June
1995. 4 '9 The subcommittee was headed by Judge Cox, a conservative
judge. This is what the subcommittee said:
PCDOs have both facilitated the provision of counsel to death-
sentenced inmates and enhanced the quality of representation.
The promise of expert advice and assistance from PCDO attor-
418. ANDREA LYON, ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL (2d ed. 1988).
419. DEFENDER SERVICES, supra note 46.
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neys has encouraged private counsel to provide representation
for death-sentenced inmates. Private lawyers who communi-
cated with the Subcommittee almost uniformly expressed the
view that they would not willingly represent a death-sentenced
inmate without the assistance of a PCDO or similar organization.
State and federal judges agreed that PCDO assistance Was critical
to the recruitment of private attorneys to represent death-sen-
tenced inmates. Furthermore, PCDOs employ staff who have
developed significant legal expertise in the fields of capital
punishment and habeas corpus law. This expertise assists private
appointed counsel in providing quality representation.
PCDOs can also enhance the quality of representation by
providing continued continuity of counsel over the course of
the case. ..420
That report was correct, but we were nevertheless defunded because
we were not supposed to win. We were just supposed to stand there
next to the guy, because it's not sporting to kill someone who does not
have a lawyer. But the people on death row are not supposed to have
good lawyers. You are not supposed to really look into the facts and
discover that, although the prosecutor said there was no deal with a
witness and that she was testifying because she was a good citizen, in
reality the prosecutor had offered to drop the murder charges against
her if she testified against the innocent defendant. 42' The fact that the
prosecutor lied would not have been known without an investiga-
tion.422 An investigation means that you actually look at the facts and
you don't assume that what things appear to be are the truth. This is
not a very American pastime. Americans tend not to want to look be-
hind the headline, to look behind the easy feeling you get when you
say, "Go get him, Charles Bronson, Rambo" and others we admire
but would convict and sentence to death in a second in court.
What has happened is that we did a little bit too good of a job.423 I
think it's really important to understand what it is that is being attacked
here.
Almost everybody would say they would prefer not to see someone
who is innocent killed. Not everyone would say that. I debated a
420. Id. at 6.
421. See, e.g., People v, Jimerson, 652 N.E.2d 278, 286 (I1. 1995). In light of
these facts, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously ordered a new trial. Id. at 288.
422. Id. at 281, 283-85.
423. For example, in 1995 alone, resource centers were responsible for the successful
representation of Antillio Watkins, Louis Ruiz, and Joe Burrows at the trial court level.
Victories in the Illinois Supreme Court included imerson, 652 N.E.2d at 278, and
People v. Mack, 658 N.E.2d 437 (Il1. 1995). Victories at the federal court level included
Emerson v. Gramley, 883 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. I1. 1995).
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prosecutor who actually said that a ten percent mistake level (which, I
believe, is the approximate percentage of people with firm death sen-
tences in Illinois who are factually innocent of the crime) is an accept-
able level of error. I am sure he wouldn't feel that way if his brother
were on death row. The problem is not so much that, but what hap-
pens when there is a really serious investigation of a conviction or a
sentence of death. What happens are things like Steve Bright spoke
about, the biases of the judiciary and the lies told by prosecutors who
have political ambitions and have no better way to get ahead than on
the, blood of a convicted murderer.424 Probably the only amusing
comment I ever heard from John Wayne Gacy, who's departed and
not especially missed by many,425 was when he was talking about the
prosecutor in the case, who speaks everywhere and is a partner at a big
firm.426 Gacy said, "Who is Bill Kunkel? He was nothing until he
met John Wayne Gacy." There is some truth in that, and that is one of
the problems.
The death penalty is portrayed as a simple answer to complex ques-
tions. It is a simple way to feel like you are in control in a country
where we feel out of control. We don't understand why someone
would blow up the Oklahoma City Federal Building. But rather than
try to understand the causes, we simply want to kill the effects.427 It is
easier, more palatable, and you can say it quicker.
It is hard to talk about habeas corpus. First of all, it isn't English
and it isn't what we are used to. And it requires thinking a little bit,
and it requires two or three sentences instead of a half of a sentence.
That is a problem. It is easier and simpler and in some ways more
satisfying to kill the problem.
Other kinds of answers are not so easy. We are willing to cut funds
for something that we know works, like Headstart, because there is no
immediate gratification. We can't see its results right now. And if we
can't see the results right now, they're not real.
424. See Comments by Stephen B. Bright, supra, at 569-80.
425. Gacy was convicted in 1980 for killing 33 young men and boys. See Susan
Kuczka & Rob Karwath, All Appeals Fail; Gacy is Executed, Serial Killer Dies of Lethal
Injection, CHi. TRIB., May 10, 1994, § 1, at 1. The State of Illinois executed Gacy by
lethal injection on May 10, 1994. Id.
426. William Kunkel served as the lead prosecutor in the Gacy case. Ted Gregory &
Jeffrey Bils, Gacy's Prosecutor Enters Nicarico Case; Lawyer Is Appointed to Study
Handling of Slaying Investigation, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1995, § 1, at 5.
427. See generally Richard A. Serrano, Death Penalty Opposed in Bombing Case,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1995, at 19 (noting that Oklahoma City bombing defendants'
attorneys argue that the death penalty is inappropriate because "the decision by the
Department of Justice in Washington to seek the death penalty for the bombing was
made even before ... [the defendants] had been identified as suspects").
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Resource centers meant that there was some semblance of organiza-
tion. At meetings of resource center directors, there was some sense
of what was going on in other places of the country, what some of the
issues judges were looking at were, what some of the things prosecu-
tors were doing were. Something which another resource center
turned up was sometimes worth looking into in your case. There was
some sense of camaraderie, but we can't have that, can we?
Prosecutors have what they call "The Fryers Club. 428 That's what
the group of attorneys general who prosecute death cases call them-
selves. They have a T-shirt that says "hot seats, safe streets."
But we can't have an organized defense, because when we did, we
were winning, particularly in the federal courts, where federal judges
have had the luxury of making decisions based on the facts and the law
in front of them with relatively little political pressure on them. But we
weren't supposed to win. We were just supposed to be there.
So what does our demise mean? It means decentralization,
fragmentation, and less quality representation overall. That is exactly
what is desired by dishonest political people who know that the death
penalty does not deter crime,429 costs more, 430 and derails much more
effective responses to crime and its causes.
It means that there won't be a central place to fight these cases.
Instead, there will just be individuals who are out there, flailing along
on their own. That is exactly what the resource centers' opponents
have in mind.
What we are talking about is not a great deal of money in the overall
scheme of things. The entire annual federal budget for all twenty re-
source centers is only twenty million dollars.43' What upsets our op-
ponents is not the money we get; it is our ability to organize the way in
which these cases are handled.
What is most disturbing to me is that it seems that, as a country, we
have forgotten history. We've been talking about VE Day and World
War II. Yet, one of the first things that happened in Germany when
the Nazis came to power was getting rid of habeas corpus. I very
much fear that I'm in Germany in 1931 but just don't realize it and
428. See David Kaplan, The Fryers Club Convention, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 1990, at
54.
429. See generally Alan i. Bigel, Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood
Marshall on Capital Punishment: Its Constitutionality, Morality, Deterrent Effect, and
Interpretation by the Court, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 40-45 (1994)
(discussing studies that indicate that the death penalty does not deter crime).
430. Id. at 49-52.
43 1. See generally Pendleton, supra note 405, at 3 (noting that Congress eliminated
the $20 million funding for the 20 legal resource centers across the country).
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should be packing my bags. And I fear that what we have now is an
embracing by the courts-certainly by the state courts and maybe soon
by the federal courts-and the legislatures and the popular media of
efficiency over efficacy, of sound bites over substance and, most of
all, an embracing use and deification of the politics of fear over fun-
damental fairness. That's what our demise means.
RONALD J. TABAK
Our next speaker will present a unique perspective, that of a former
member of the federal judiciary.432 When we have tried in the past to
get current members of the judiciary, we've always been told that they
can't speak because all the things Steve Bright says would happen to
them would happen to them. Fortunately, here in Chicago, at my law
firm, is an exemplar of the kind of person we need to have adjudicat-
ing these cases: Susan Getzendanner, a partner in the Chicago office
of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, where she specializes in
litigation. A former judge in the United States District Court in the
Northern District of Illinois, Susan now tries cases all over the country
and maintains a steady flow of pro bono activities. In 1991, the
National Law Journal identified her as one of the top ten trial lawyers
in the country. 433 As coordinator of the firm's pro bono work, I am
particularly pleased that she has been recognized recently for her
Chairmanship of Mayor Daley's Blue Ribbon Panel that created a
constitutionally sound minority set-aside program for the City of
Chicago.434  Here is former United States District Judge Susan
Getzendanner.
SUSAN GETZENDANNER
Having decided many habeas cases, I do bring a unique perspective
to this debate. I remember quite well my first case. The jury in the
state criminal case had still been deliberating at 2 a.m. when they sent a
note to the judge asking if they could go home and return the following
day. The judge's reply was: "Continue deliberating." A guilty verdict
432. Ms. Getzendanner was a United States District Court Judge for the Northern
District of Illinois from 1980 to 1987.
433. See Margaret C. Fisk, Winning: Successful Strategies from 10 Litigators Who
Stand Apart from the Crowd, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at S5 (noting that "Ms.
Getzendanner is perhaps the best-known woman attorney in Chicago, as well as a highly
sought-after litigator nationally").
434. See generally Jan C. Greenburg, Affirmative Action Down but not Out; Chicago
Experience Shows Plans Survive with Strong Support, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1995, § 1, at
I (discussing Chicago's Blue Ribbon Panel and affirmative action plans).
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came back five minutes later. To me, this was unthinkable, and I eas-
ily granted the writ. I was astonished when my decision was re-
versed.
The reversal in that and other habeas cases showed me that reason-
able, smart, fair people who have a common interest in justice have
very different views of the world. They have different starting points
and reach opposite results on habeas issues. The political/social biases
that judges bring to the bench cannot be disregarded. There is an
enormous difference between a liberal Democrat judge, which some
would say I was, although I believe I was in the middle, and a conser-
vative Republican judge. There are even degrees of difference be-
tween conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans.
Those differences will dominate the disposition of habeas cases if
the proposed legislation becomes law. The proposed law creates many
opportunities for judges to make decisions regarding each of numerous
statutory procedural barriers. Those decisions will be driven by the
political/social bias the judge brought to the courthouse, and you can't
realistically expect any other result.
I was willing as a citizen to agree to some changes Congress has
proposed to make habeas cases more efficient-provided there remains
one clear shot on constitutional issues to the federal court. If you give
a judge of any political stripe the constitutional issue to decide, she will
decide that issue. This would increase the chance of a decision on the
basis of law. Instead of giving the judge a number of ways to avoid
the merits of the case by not allowing the case to proceed, make the
judge decide that issue: was there a constitutional violation or wasn't
there?
Congress really ought to go back to the drawing board. One clear
shot is so simple, so well defined, that this approach would in fact
produce efficiency in these cases. On the other hand, the proposed
legislation4 35 would create about twelve years' worth of litigation be-
fore lawyers and courts understand what the statute means. Congress
is creating a bonanza for opportunities to litigate, and thereby delay the
disposition of, habeas cases. The bill is confusing, contains many
very general statements that will require interpretation, and creates
many procedural barriers that will chew up the time of the court.
Congress is shooting itself in the foot.
Federal courts would do a good job with one clear shot. Judges like
to decide constitutional issues and they are good at that. Let judges
435. See Comments by Professor Larry Yackle, supra, at 561-68.
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spend their time on the merits of the claim rather than decide procedu-
ral issues on the numerous entry barriers.
Habeas is clearly needed in this country. In Chicago, most of the
habeas cases in the federal court are competency of counsel cases.
There is a difference between state law and federal law on attorney
competence. Accordingly, if a petitioner alleges incompetency of
counsel, the state court judge's finding, after a hearing, that the lawyer
was competent is not binding on the federal judge.
So, I conducted several hearings judging the competency of coun-
sel. The horror stories that you sometimes hear are sometimes true.
The lawyers did terrible jobs in some of these cases. The defendants
were not represented. The lawyers were young, asleep, drunk. I re-
call one lawyer who defended his client before the jury and argued that
the crime was really committed by the Devil. That one somehow got
past the state law standard on attorney competence. More often than
not, lawyers would come in and testify, for the defendant, that they in
fact had performed incompetently. It would be unjust to deny any de-
fendant his one clear shot to federal review.
We have talked about the loss of the Illinois Capital Resource
Center. My colleagues in Skadden's Chicago office have at least one
and usually two death penalty cases going at any one time. I would
not do a capital matter without the Illinois Capital Resource Center.
The elimination of these resources to aid private firm death penalty
lawyers cannot be justified.
It's also happening on the civil side. The National Clearinghouse
for Legal Services, which provides the same sort of resources to
poverty lawyers, public interest lawyers, and private lawyers doing
pro bono work, at last report will lose its federal funding at the end of
the year, with only three months to close up.4 36 The destruction of
these organizations is irreversible; it seems that this is the congres-
sional aim.
I don't know what I could do about these important issues, or what
can be done by others. The assault on habeas and legal resources for
those who need them most probably cannot be stopped. We are
preaching to the converted here, and there are not enough of us in the
room.
436. See John F. Rooney, Senate Action Saving LSC Draws Praise, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Oct. 2, 1995, at 1.
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RONALD J. TABAK
We are now going to hear perspectives from prosecutors, beginning
with E. Michael McCann, who was first elected District Attorney of
Milwaukee County, Wisconsin in 1968 and has been re-elected every
two years. He currently chairs the ABA Criminal Justice Section. He
received a Bachelor of Law from Georgetown University and has an
L.L.M. from Harvard University. District Attorney McCann's office
was responsible for convicting the notorious Jeffrey Dahmer. 37
District Attorney McCann has been a leader in efforts to prevent the
reimposition of the death penalty in the State of Wisconsin. Several
years ago, District Attorney McCann was the most eloquent speaker in
support when the ABA adopted a resolution to oppose racial discrimi-
nation in capital punishment. Here is District Attorney Michael
McCann.
E. MICHAEL MCCANN
As we know, the ABA does not have a position on the death
penalty, although it has supported the proposed Racial Justice Act.438
You may recall that, in 1994, two things delayed enactment of the
Federal Crime Act: the assault weapons provision and the Racial
Justice Act. 43 9  The Board of the National District Attorneys
Association, on which I sit, fought bitterly against the Racial Justice
Act440 and unfortunately was successful. The President thereby re-
duced the opposition to passing the Federal Crime Act, by excluding
the Racial Justice Act, and it was passed. 4'
437. See Jim Stingl, Dahmer's Macabre Killing Made Him Infamous Worldwide,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1994, at A8. Dahmer confessed in 1991 to drugging,
murdering, and dismembering 17 young men and boys. Id. A Milwaukee County jury
determined that Dahmer was sane at the time of the killings and the trial judge sentenced
him to nearly 1000 years in prison. Id. A fellow inmate beat Dahmer to death in a
prison bathroom in 1994. Louis Sahagun, Dahmer Slain in Prison Attack; Inmate Held,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at 1.
438. See Tabak, supra note 263, at 777 (giving an adaptation of the May 3, 1990
congressional testimony of the American Bar Association in support of the proposed
Racial Justice Act).
439. H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 601-11 (1994). See generally Death of
Fairness, supra note 308, at 1122 n.48 (explaining that the Racial Justice Act would
have "allow[ed] convicts to challenge their death sentences by using evidence that
reveals 'a pattern of racially discriminatory death sentencing"') (citation omitted).
440. See H.R. 3315, §§ 601-11.
441. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 1796.
594 [Vol. 27
Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?
When I read McCleskey v. Kemp,442 I noticed that one of the at-
tacks was that the Atlanta District Attorney's office had apparently not
established a policy as to the cases in which capital punishment would
be pursued. Of course, Mr. McCleskey was not successful. But
Justice Powell's majority decision invited legislative bodies to address
the issue of disparities in sentencing between cases in which the vic-
tims were white and cases in which the victims were black. The Racial
Justice Act was a response to that, since it was a legislative attempt to
address racial disparities in sentencing patterns."3
I testified before Congress in 1989 against the then proposed ex-
pansion of grounds for the federal death penalty. The Federal Crime
Act of 19944' very measureably expanded the grounds for federal
capital punishment. I noticed that the Anti-Terrorism Act introduced
by Representative Hyde would make all murders of federal officers in
performance of their duties subject to the death penalty." 5 I would
suspect that would be a substantial broadening element.
I am speaking here as a prosecutor who opposes the adoption of
capital punishment in a state which is close to enacting it. I am in my
twenty-seventh year as district attorney, having run every two years. I
assume this may be an issue in the next campaign. It was the only real
issue upon which the Republican opponent ran against Wisconsin's
Attorney General last year.'
As you can imagine, during my twenty-seven years as district attor-
ney, we have made mistakes in convicting people. I recall one case
that just stunned me. We convicted a man of attempted murder, ab-
duction, and a savage rape. All the evidence was, in my opinion, ex-
tremely persuasive. The jury believed that and convicted him.
However, it later became possible to test semen and determine blood
types and from that exclude certain individuals, and the semen from
the young victim's panties was still in sufficient condition to be tested
442. 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (holding that a sophisticated study indicating that,
even after holding other factors constant, killers of whites were far more likely to be
given the death penalty in Georgia than killers of blacks did not establish a
constitutional claim).
443. H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 601-11 (1994).
444. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 1796.
445. H.R. 2703, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. § 101 (1995) (proposed to amend 18 U.S.C.
§ 114 (1994)).
446. See generally Amy Rinard, Death Penalty, 'Gungate' Fuel Heated Attorney
General Race, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 1994, at A8 (noting that Republican
candidate Jeffrey Wagner "has based his campaign on the most emotional and
controversial crime issue of the day, the death penalty").
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by two laboratories. It was determined that the defendant could not
have been the assailant.
He served eight years behind bars. If it had been a murder, there
was sufficient evidence that, in my opinion, we would have convicted
him. If he had then received the death penalty and there had been the
kind of fast track for adjudicating post-conviction proceedings which
is now being proposed, the exonerating evidence would not have be-
come available in time to save his life.
The exonerating evidence had not been available earlier because you
formerly had to have blood at the scene and blood samples from the
defendant-not merely semen-to determine whether or not a person
could have done such a crime. But it was later discovered that certain
types of persons are "secretors," that there is a crossover from their
blood system to their semen, and that you can test the semen left in the
vagina or on the garments of the victim to determine whether or not the
accused could have committed the crime.
I am sure many of you have read the Stanford Law Review article
detailing, over the last number of decades, a great number of cases in
which it appears to conscientious reviewers that innocent persons were
convicted of first-degree murder." 7
As a prosecutor, I should also note the cases in years past where a
judge or appellate panel seems to have extended the search and seizure
laws in order to overturn a homicide conviction where the court did not
wish that person executed. Maybe the judges in those cases suspected
the verdicts' propriety, but the search and seizure laws were distorted
in order to save people. In the mood that exists today, I'm sure the
concern is that the search and seizure laws will be twisted in order to
facilitate executions.
Of course, capital punishment is costly.4 48 We know that. The
studies that have been done in Florida and North Carolina suggest that
it involves millions of dollars, when you take the costs of all the cases
that start out as capital punishment cases and divide those costs by the
number of executions.449 When I argue this way, some respond that
that's the reason we have to cut back on habeas corpus and expedite
447. See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 36, 173-79 (1987).
448. See generally Death Penalty Carries Steep Price Tag, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Sept. I1, 1995, at 10A (stating that the cost of reinstating the death penalty in
Wisconsin would include "$2.2 million to build and outfit a 12-unit death row, including
a death chamber[,] $458,000 a year to staff it[, and] $375,916 a year in salaries and
related expenses for each death-row defendant's representation and appeals").
449. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & DONNA B. SLAWSON, THE COSTS OF PROCESSING
MURDER CASES IN NORTH CAROLINA I (1993).
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matters so that we don't have sagas where it takes fifteen years to get a
person executed.
There is unquestionably racism in capital punishment. I don't think
anyone who conducts an honest study of capital punishment can fail to
see that it is polluted with racism. Indeed, racism isn't strictly re-
stricted to capital punishment. A number of years ago, there was a
thorough study of four types of crime in Wisconsin covering, I be-
lieve, burglary, robbery, theft, and aggravated battery. They studied
our county, Milwaukee County, and Dane County, which includes our
capital, Madison, and the University of Wisconsin, which is very lib-
eral politically. The researchers tried to see if they could determine
whether racism was playing a role. They discovered that for two types
of crimes, armed robbery and another crime, racism was playing a role
in sentencing in Milwaukee County and the very liberal Dane County.
This is in Wisconsin, a generally progressive state.
A number of years ago, Andy Sonner450 and I had a discussion after
the ABA (with Andy's and my help) opposed racial discrimination in
capital punishment. We wondered how many prosecutions could be
successful if the Racial Justice Act test451 were applied to all types of
prosecutions, not just to capital punishment. We were two DAs trou-
bled by what the role of racism might be in sentencing for all types of
crime.
Then there is the poverty aspect. Poor people unquestionably will
wind up with insufficient counsel. But rarely indeed, if ever, does one
read of a rich man being executed. The Dane County District
Attorney 452 and I have appeared a number of times to oppose the
adoption of capital punishment in our State, and he often speaks of the
fact that he will not, as district attorney, be reduced to the level of
killing people. In a capital punishment system, no matter how we
decorate it, we, as district attorneys would be involved in the killing.
That is so when one strips away the various symbols which our soci-
ety uses to get people to respect what is happening, including the
judges who sit on elevated platforms and wear black robes in order to
450. Andrew L. Sonner is the State's Attorney for Montgomery County, Maryland.
See infra, at 602-05, for the remarks of Mr. Sonner.
451. The Racial Justice Act would have allowed the use of statistical evidence to
establish a racially discriminatory pattern in the imposition or execution of the death
penalty. H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 601-11 (1994). See also Death of
Fairness?, supra note 308, at 1105, 1152 n.115 (discussing the Racial Justice Act and
noting that it was eventually excised from the 1994 Crime Act) (citing Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(108 Stat.) 1796).
452. The Dane County District Attorney is C. William Frost.
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summon the respect of the community. I, at fifty-eight years of age,
having abhorred killing all these years, do not see myself getting in-
volved in killings any more than the Dane County District Attorney.
I serve on a committee of district attorneys that handles some as-
pects of collective bargaining with the state-wide assistant district at-
torneys' union. One of the few issues in the current collective bargain-
ing concerns the involvement of assistant district attorneys if
Wisconsin were to enact capital punishment. Interestingly enough, the
union is pursuing a provision in the collective bargaining agreement
that assistant district attorneys will not be put in jeopardy if they refuse
to participate in the prosecution of capital punishment cases. I support
them in that regard. One of my colleagues, who was on the executive
committee of the Wisconsin District Attorneys Association, says the
main reason he wants to be able to seek the death punishment is be-
cause it would provide leverage in plea bargaining.
My office has wrestled with the question of what sentence to seek
under our current law. The question arose after a Wisconsin statute ef-
fective in 1988 added a penalty for first-degree murder under which
the judge can set the parole date so far beyond the defendant's life ex-
pectancy that he or she certainly will die behind bars.453 I asked my
deputies to reread the McCleskey case.454 We put together a racially
mixed committee which studies the aggravating and mitigating grounds
in these cases to decide after conviction what sentence to seek.
We do not use our discretion regarding what sentence we will seek
as a basis for plea bargaining, because the possibility of a sentence
which lasts one's natural life can be overwhelming. I can't imagine
what spending one's entire remaining life in jail would be like. A per-
son who may be contending that he is innocent could be confronted
with the options of (1) plea bargaining, pleading guilty to first-degree
murder and getting life, which might mean parole in thirteen years
(although very few get paroled that soon, the average being twenty
years), or (2) taking the case to a contest and risking being sentenced
for the rest of the person's natural life. It seems to me that that is an
inhuman option to impose on a person who may be arguing that he is
innocent. As a result, our policy is that we will not negotiate these
cases. We proceed and then, after the conviction, the committee re-
views these cases to decide on our recommendation considering the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
453. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 973.014 (West Supp. 1994).
454. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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Probably the most forceful argument for the death penalty is retribu-
tion.4"' Those of us who have been around for a while remember Von
Hirsch's "Just Deserts" theory of punishment, which asserted that
punishment is the main ground for the criminal justice system to incar-
cerate.456 That seems to have grown stronger and stronger as a ratio-
nale for the imposition of penalty and punishment. The most forceful
proponents of capital punishment in our State are saying, "Look at this
as retribution. It's punishment. Don't try to argue deterrence."
Because, as we all know, the evidence on deterrence is quite mixed.
Although our State is one of only twelve without capital
punishment,457 we have the sixteenth lowest homicide rate in the
country. 458 I think ours is 4.4 per 100,000.4 19 Texas, as I recall, is
several times higher,4' ° and we all know that it's the execution capital
of the country." j
Obviously, fear has a lot to do with support for the death penalty.
People are afraid, although our murder rate, thank goodness, is drop-
ping a little bit-although not as much as it has dropped in New York
in recent years prior to its implementation of capital punishment.
We are in a struggle now in Wisconsin to oppose the reinstitution of
the death penalty. 2 It is believed that the Wisconsin assembly would
455. See, e.g., HUGO A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1982).
456. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 45-46 (1976); see also Marc Miller,
Purposes of Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 431 (1992) (explaining that reformers
such as Von Hirsch criticized the rehabilitive theory of punishment "and offered in its
place some version of just deserts as the primary organizing principle for sentencing")
(footnote omitted).
457. The 12 states without capital punishment are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Bright & Kennan, supra note 332, at 779 n.88 (listing
those states with capital punishment statutes).
458. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 200
(1995) (listing 1993 homicide rates).
459. Id.
460. Id. (noting that the 1993 homicide rate in Texas was 11.9 per 100,000
population).
461. Since 1976, Texas has carried out more than twice as many executions as any
other state. Mauro, supra note 193, at 3A (indicating that Texas has executed 104
prisoners since the 1976 reinstatement of capital punishment).
462. Editor's Note: On March 28, 1996, the Wisconsin Senate rejected a plan which
would have asked Wisconsin voters in November 1996 whether they want a death
penalty in Wisconsin. Mike Flaherty, Senate Quashes Death Penalty, Referendum
Defeated in 21-12 Vote, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 29, 1996, at lB. The referendum would have
been non-binding. Matt Pommer, Senate Rejects Death Penalty Vote, THE CAPITAL TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), Mar. 29, 1996, at 3A. Death penalty proponents in the Wisconsin
Senate sought the referendum after admitting they lacked the votes for restoring
executions. Id.
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adopt it, but there are two persons in the State Senate who have been
stopping it from going forward. We had capital punishment in
Wisconsin for five years, from 1848 to 1853. In 1850, there was a
tragic murder in Kenosha County followed by a conviction, after
which a mob witnessed the offender's hanging outside the jail.463 In
revulsion, the State rejected the death penalty, and we have not had it
since 1853. 46
I hate to tell you the following, because I am a Democrat. President
Clinton is running an ad in certain states, apparently as a preliminary to
next year's campaign. The ad says three things: (1) fight assault
weapons (I certainly agree with the President on that); (2) we need
100,000 policemen, which was part of the 1994 Federal Crime Act;465
and (3) we need to expand the death penalty. The first time I saw the
ad, I was stunned. This ad is running in our State at a time when we,
one of only twelve remaining states that don't have it, are considering
restoring the death penalty. As a Democrat, I feel terribly tom by this.
I do not know, but I assume the President believes in the death
penalty. As Governor of Arkansas, he left his presidential campaign
for a few days to return to Arkansas while a person was executed
there.466 Certainly, you cannot anticipate that whatever passes
Congress would be vetoed on the grounds that the President opposes
it, because he apparently is advocating the expansion of the death
penalty .4
The bar has surveyed the prosecutors of Wisconsin. A 65% major-
ity favors a life without parole sentence as opposed to capital punish-
ment, for various reasons. (The Wisconsin District Attorneys Asso-
ciation has not taken a position on capital punishment because, as with
gun control, that would divide and split the association.).
463. George H. Kendall, in Are Executions in New York Inevitable?, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 557, 592 (1995). See also Mike Miller, Hung Up in the Death Penalty, THE
CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Oct. 22, 1994, at IA (noting that newspaper articles
describing the August 21, 1851 execution stated that an estimated 3000 people attended
the hanging).
464. Miller, supra note 463, at IA.
465. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 1796.
466. Marshall Frady, Annals of Law and Politics: Death in Arkansas, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105-15; George E. Jordan, Lawyer: Execution a Disgrace,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 4, 1992, at 19.
467. Ann Devroy, White House Shows Clinton Campaign Ads; TV Messages
Promote Assault Weapons Ban, WASH. POST, June 27, 1995, at A4 (describing a Clinton
television advertisement wherein President Clinton advocates expansion of the death
penalty); see David Maraniss, Clinton's Journey of the Spirit, WASH. POST NAT'L
WEEKLY ED., July 13-19, 1992, at 10, 11.
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I can't predict what's going to happen in Wisconsin. The State
Senate is the critical area. It was pretty clear that we had the votes to
stop it there if it had been voted on in May, but the vote was delayed
until September.4 The battle continues. We don't have the money to
run anti-capital punishment ads like the President's pro-capital pun-
ishment ads. If it goes to a referendum, somehow we will try to raise
the money to inform the public. We felt slightly wounded when New
York went over469 and the number of non-death penalty states was
diminished down to twelve. But we will continue to fight.
RONALD J. TABAK
I want to add two perspectives. First, those who argue that elimi-
nating habeas corpus would make the death penalty cheaper than the
alternative are not correct. The extra cost of the death penalty princi-
pally arises from the extra trials that occur when the death penalty is
sought-most of which do not end up with death penalty verdicts, and
even fewer of which ultimately lead to executions.47 ° Second, the
President did not appoint any commission after the Racial Justice
Act47' was deleted from last year's crime legislation.472
We'll now turn to our next speaker, who is also a prosecutor but
has a somewhat different perspective. Andrew Sonner is serving his
seventh term as State's Attorney for Montgomery County, Maryland,
having first been elected in 1970. He taught government and politics
at Walter Johnson High School in Bethesda, Maryland, while attend-
ing American University's Washington College of Law at night. He is
a past chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Section. His office is cur-
rently seeking the death penalty in a case, as it has done on some other
occasions. Ten years ago, State's Attorney Sonner wrote an excellent
article in the state bar journal decrying the fact that there are no stan-
dards to guide prosecutors as to when they should seek the death
penalty.473 Here is State's Attorney Andrew Sonner.
468. See supra note 462 (explaining the current status of Wisconsin's proposed death
penalty statute).
469. New York's death penalty statute was enacted on March 7, 1995. Dao, supra
note 195, at AI; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 1996).
470. See COOK & SLAWSON, supra note 449, at 97-98. About 10% of the defendants
sentenced to the death penalty are eventually executed. Id. at 3.
471. H.R. 3315, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 601-11 (1994).
472. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 1796.
473. Andrew Sonner, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty, MD. B.J., Mar.
1985, at 6, 7.
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ANDREw L. SONNER
Years ago, I got a letter which I later learned was a joke. It was
from an itinerant preacher who said that he went around the country
preaching in tents about the evils of alcohol. A man named Clyde
would sit on the podium with him as a drunk, with clothes all mussed
and slobbering and so forth. The preacher would point to him as an
example of the evils of drink. The letter said that Clyde had unfortu-
nately died and that I was suggested as a person to replace him. I feel
like that as a prosecutor that you can point to as somebody who is in-
volved in the imposition of the death penalty.
Let me say at the beginning that I agree with Mike [McCann].474
There is absolutely no value to the prosecution of having the death
penalty. There is an absolutely huge cost in the administration of it.
As conscientiously as I try to do it, I must confess that I do not know
how to do it and achieve fairness. I wish at the time of the Gregg v.
Georgia decision,475 the Supreme Court would have indulged in
Dickens's Christmas Carol476 and gone forth and looked at capital
punishment previous, capital punishment as it existed then, and capital
punishment as it was to be administered; had they known the mess
they would create for us prosecutors, I think it would have been nine-
to-zero opposing the death penalty. Clearly, two justices who were in
the majority in Gregg (Justices Powell and Blackmun) have later
changed their minds.477
Justice White's concurring opinion in Gregg says that you don't
have to worry about prosecutors acting in a "standardless fashion" be-
cause all they do is consider "the strength of their case and the likeli-
hood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts." 47 If
we just did that, we would have a whole host of cases going forward,
and it would be chaos. I admit that it is chaos now, and it is also false
promises.
474. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, supra, at 594-601.
475. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
476. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (Pocket Books, Inc., 1939) (1843).
477. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (concluding that the death penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitutional);
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994). Jeffries notes that after
Justice Powell's retirement, Powell suggested that Congress and state legislatures take a
serious look at "whether retention of a punishment that is being enforced only
haphazardly is in the public interest." Id. Powell stated that if he were in the state
legislature, he would vote against capital punishment. Id.
478. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
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We have roughly 3000 people on death row, and there were 31 exe-
cutions in 1994 and 38 in 1993. 479 Executions occur in such a small
percentage of even those cases in which death verdicts are imposed
that it's an exercise in futility.
Having said that, let me add that you have prosecutors from the City
of New York saying in varying degrees that they are not going to use
it. The Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson has said that he is ab-
solutely not going to use it.480 Mayor Giuliani criticized him, saying
that he would not be upholding the law. District Attorney Johnson
replied that he would be upholding the law, since it gives him the au-
thority as to whether or not he is going to seek the death penalty. 48'
Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau wrote a very thought-
ful article in the New York Times opposing the death penalty while the
legislation was pending. 4 2 After it was adopted, he said that, now
that it's the law, he will consider it, but he has not come out and said
that he is actually going to seek it.483
As Ron[ald J. Tabak] mentioned,484 we have one pending death
penalty case in Montgomery County.485 The case will probably go to
trial sometime next winter. I have had to detach two attorneys full-
time to prepare that case. There are two very fine defense attorneys on
the other side who are going to be paid by the public defender, and
they are working roughly full-time on the case. This has been pending
now for six or seven months. Is it justified in a cost-benefit analysis?
Are the two defendants likely to get the death penalty? I really don't
know. I do know, however, that the community wanted the death
penalty.
479. DEATH Row USA, supra note 46, at 3.
480. Adam Nossiter, In New York City, A Mixed Response to Law From Prosecutors,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at B5. Editor's Note: See supra notes 103-110 for a
discussion of recent developments regarding District Attorney Johnson and the death
penalty.
48 1. Nossiter, supra note 480, at B5.
482. Robert Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1995, at A25 (calling capital punishment "a mirage that distracts society from more
fruitful, less facile answers").
483. See Nossiter, supra note 480, at B5.
484. See Comments by Ronald J. Tabak, supra, at 601.
485. Editor's Note: On October 16, 1995 a Montgomery County (Maryland) jury
sentenced hit man James Edward Perry to death for murdering three people, including a
severely disabled eight-year-old boy. Karl Vick, Jurors in Triple Slaying Make the
Toughest Choice; Hit Man's Death Sentence a Rarity in Montgomery, WASH. POST, Oct.
18, 1995, at D3. The father of the boy allegedly hired Perry to kill his son for insurance
money. Id. The father's trial is slated to begin in April 1996, with Montgomery County
prosecutors again seeking the death penalty. New Lawyer for Horn, WASH. POST, Dec.
23, 1995, at D4.
1996] 603
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
My situation may bear on what the New York prosecutors I men-
tioned before may face. I usually don't have an opponent when I run
for re-election. But this last time, I had several opponents, and two
really defining issues. One was the prosecution of a police officer for
having shot in the chest and killed a suspect who got out of the car
with a Frito bag in her hand. The officer had armed himself with a
shotgun in order to respond to a stabbing, and was looking for a per-
son who had used a broken Coke bottle. We prosecuted him for
manslaughter and convicted him, and he went to jail. So, the police
union was opposed to me. I had to go up against 864 police officers.
The other issue was my opposition to the death penalty-in not believ-
ing it is justified. My opponent said that if he were elected, he would
use it more often. If that had been the only factor in the election and I
didn't have a record of six previous terms, I would have lost easily in
one of the most sophisticated counties in the United States, with a high
degree of government workers with good educations and Ph.D.s.
There's no question in my mind that in the politics of today in the
whole area of criminal justice, the death penalty is the symbolic, get-
tough approach to crime. Quite frankly, I'm ashamed as a Democrat to
see the Democrats trying to trump the Republicans on this issue.
When Democrats simply come out in favor of the death penalty, there
is not a Willie Horton-type of issue to define the difference between
the Democrats and the Republicans.
In Maryland, the prosecutor has to certify each case in which he
seeks the death penalty. My office has certified thirteen cases since
Furman v. Georgia.486 Eleven of those thirteen cases had African
American defendants. I was put through a post-conviction proceeding
where I felt most uncomfortable sitting in the chair as the defense at-
torney very properly brought up each file and asked, "In this case, was
the defendant white or black?" Quite frankly, I did not know in one
instance, because it turned out that the defendant pled guilty before we
went ahead with the trial.
I agree that racism is very much an ugly part of the American
character today. Try as I might to do it as fairly as I possibly could,
the net result was, of the thirteen people that we had certified, eleven
of them were African Americans, although there are probably only
eight to ten percent African Americans within our county.
I don't like to watch Court TV because I despise the way that it
turns every trial into something like a Saturday afternoon football game
486. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding the death penalty as it then existed in Georgia
unconstitutional).
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in discussing strategy. But sometimes I turn it on in spite of myself. I
turned it on one day and saw a middle-aged woman, rather attractive,
looking like a lot of people within this room, sitting at a table-and she
was really kind of pleading for her life. As it went forward, I saw that
she was one of the Manson family killers and was there at a parole
hearing, asking to be paroled. I thought to myself: what terrible pun-
ishment that woman is going through after these many, many years;
how much easier it would have been for her to simply go into oblivion
some twenty-five years earlier.
As to which punishment is worse, I find it hard to say. Anybody
who has undergone anesthesia knows that if we were to die while
we're under anesthesia, there would be no pain, no suffering. This
woman is suffering every day of her life, and probably will for the rest
of her term.
I tried to explain that to the family of the victim who came to me and
wanted us to seek the death penalty. I asked, which is the worse
penalty, the simple death penalty or life in prison? In my opinion, the
worse penalty is that given to the person who stays there with not
much of a meaningful life and who completes that penalty in a box.
The last thing I'd like to leave you with is that there is no net benefit
for the prosecutor. It's a huge, huge undertaking. It's an enormous
political liability. Certainly, you cannot make the case for deterrence,
but you can make the case for revenge. The families we deal with are
survivors of murder victims who, because it's on the table, because
it's an option, want the death penalty. They somehow value the life of
the person who has departed by how much revenge you're willing to
take out as a prosecutor. A father came in and asked me how he was
going to explain to his son that I did not go for the ultimate penalty in
the death of his mother. It's very hard to make an explanation, yet
making such decisions is what we're in the business of doing.
Having the death penalty is not the soundest way to effectuate the
kinds of ideals that we wish to propose as a country. In the long run,
the Supreme Court is somehow going to revisit the issue and, perhaps
attaching a cost-benefit analysis to it, will free us from the obligation
of going forward. As I said, I try to do it as fairly as I possibly can,
and I don't think that I'm doing it fairly.
RONALD J. TABAK
You will now hear about two people whose guilt or innocence is
severely in question, from Jeffrey Urdangen, a Chicago attorney who
has been trial counsel for numerous capital defendants, in state and
federal courts. Beginning in 1989, Mr. Urdangen, with co-counsel,
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has represented Alejandro Hemandez in the Nicarico murder case, one
of the most controversial capital cases in Illinois history.4 7 A fourth
trial is pending for Mr. Hernandez, who no longer can receive a death
sentence. A third trial is pending for his co-defendant, Rolando Cruz,
whose possible innocence 60 Minutes has discussed. Mr. Urdangen
has written and spoken extensively about the legal and political signifi-
cance of the case. He is a board member of Illinois Attorneys for
Criminal Justice and chair of its Death Penalty Committee. Here is
Jeffrey Urdangen.
JEFFREY URDANGEN
It was refreshing to listen to the prosecutors who preceded me dis-
cuss the political backdrop for capital prosecutions. It was also nice to
hear Mr. McCann, an eminent prosecutor, admit to having made a
mistake and having been willing to rectify that mistake.48 Sadly, that
is all too rare when innocent people have been convicted, particularly
in capital cases.
That's the underlying problem in the Nicarico case. Rolando Cruz
and Alex Hernandez have been incarcerated for eleven-and-a-half years
for crimes in which they did not participate and about which they had
no knowledge. Much of that time, particularly Cruz's time, has been
spent on death row. I'm not here to convince you of the innocence of
Alex Hernandez or Rolando Cruz, who, scandalously, still face retri-
als.489 Their innocence is a foregone conclusion for anybody knowl-
edgeable with the history of this egregious prosecution. The case's
significance for today's discussion is that it shows that the state court
487. See infra note 489 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the trials.
488. See Comments by E. Michael McCann, supra, at 595-96.
489. The State has tried Cruz and Hernandez multiple times for the 1983 murder of
.Jeanine Nicarico. Maurice Possley, The Nicarico Nightmare: Admitted Lie Sinks Cruz
Case, Cat. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1995, § 1, at 1. The first trial, in 1985, resulted in
convictions and death sentences for both Cruz and Hernandez. Id. In 1988, the Illinois
Supreme Court ordered new trials for both defendants, citing trial court error. Id.
Hernandez's second trial resulted in a hung jury. Ted Gregory, Hernandez Team Ready for
a Fight, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1995, at i. Cruz's second trial again produced a conviction
and death sentence. Possley, supra, at 1. Hernandez's third trial resulted in a conviction
and 80-year prison sentence. Gregory, supra, at 1. An Illinois appellate court reversed
Hernandez's second conviction in January 1995. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court later
affirmed the appellate court's reversal. Id.
In 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court again ordered a new trial for Cruz, finding trial
error. Possley, supra, at 1. Editor's Note: Cruz's third trial resulted in an acquittal. Id.
The DuPage County State's Attorney's office dropped all charges against Hernandez
prior to his fourth trial. No 4th Trial for Hernandez, CM. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1995, § I, at I
(Eve. Update). See infra notes 490-517 and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of the facts of the case.
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system is not where we should place our final faith-whether or not
people who are convicted of capital crimes are guilty of those crimes.
Briefly, in 1983, a young girl named Jeanine Nicarico was abducted
from her own home and then raped and murdered on an obscure hik-
ing trail-one of the most unspeakable crimes one could imagine, a
nightmare of any parent.490 All the evidence immediately following the
murder pointed to a sole white perpetrator. But as the case evolved,
the racist fantasies of the local prosecutor led to the arrest a year later
of two young Hispanic men, against whom there was no evidence. A
white man was also arrested, and the crime was depicted as a burglary
gone badly.49' The only reason for these indictments was the impend-
ing vote for the Republican candidate for State's Attorney of DuPage
County. The ensuing show trial was presided over by a judge who
was later reversed for abusing his discretion in conducting it.492
After the two Hispanic men were convicted for this murder they had
nothing to do with, a most remarkable thing happened-something
that separates this particular miscarriage of justice from so many other
equally tragic cases, and gives this case a bizarre wrinkle. In 1985, a
serial killer named Brian Dugan was arrested for the murder of a
young girl named Melissa Ackerman.493 The case bore striking simi-
larities to the Nicarico murder.494 Nobody noticed it except for a cou-
ple of policemen who were interested in these types of things.
Eventually, Brian Dugan, in saving his life, negotiated pleas, which
local prosecutors quickly accepted, whereby he received two life terms
for two murders and several sex crimes.4 95 In the context of his con-
fessions, he also admitted to killing Jeanine Nicarico. 496 He gave
chilling details of the crime, indicative of first-hand knowledge, and
was consistent and unwavering. 497 He knew the color of her under-
490. Possley, supra note 489, at 1.
49 1. Id. (noting that the State also initially charged Stephen Buckley with the crime;
Buckley's trial resulted in a hung jury and the State eventually dropped the charges).
492. People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18, 27 (I11.) (concluding that prejudice arising from
the prosecution's use of inculpatory statements of codefendants was predictable enough
to necessitate a severance), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988); People v. Hernandez, 521
N.E.2d 25, 34 (111.) (finding that Hernandez was deprived of his constitutional right to
confront a prosecution witness because of insufficient redaction), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
869 (1988).
493. Possley, supra note 489, at 1.
494. Id. (explaining that Dugan was convicted for sexually attacking and murdering
eight-year-old Melissa Ackerman).
495. See People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 645-46 (Ill. 1994) [hereinafter Cruz I]
(describing Dugan's statements and plea bargain).
496. Id. at 645-46.
497. See id. at 646.
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garments, the number of blows, the precise location of where she was
murdered.4 98 He described the interior of the house.4 99 He described
the type of tape that was used to put around her head.5°° His DNA
matched.50' His boot print matched on the door that he had kicked
in.50 2 He was able to take investigators to all the pertinent sites.50 3 So
that his confession to this crime couldn't be used against him, it was
couched in terms of hypotheticals. He wanted to avoid the death
penalty for this crirne as well.5°
The DuPage County prosecutors would not accept the truth of his
statements, even though there was no evidence tying the Hispanics on
death row to this crime. Indeed, after the Hernandez and Cruz convic-
tions were reversed based on issues unrelated to Brian Dugan,0 5 these
prosecutors did everything they could to keep from the next jury the
details about Brian Dugan's confessions. Eventually, the same presid-
ing judge permitted only a very limited amount of evidence about Brian
Dugan, and would not let the jury at Rolando Cruz's next trial hear that
Brian Dugan had committed similar sex crimes and murders.5' 6 After
this incredible violation of existing Illinois law, Rolando Cruz was
again convicted.0 7 Alex Hernandez's second trial ended in a hung
jury.50 8 In his third trial, Alex was convicted, 5°9 but he has now been
spared the death penalty.
It soon became clear to everybody who was not politically motivated
that these were innocent men on death row. You don't have to take it
from me, a partisan. Jerry Margolis, who was the head of the Illinois
State Police at the time that Brian Dugan was arrested, publicly de-
clared that these men were innocent.10 Mary Brigid Kenney, who
was assigned to write the State's appellate brief against Rolando Cruz,
498. Id. at 646-47 (noting that Dugan knew the precise location where Nicarico was
murdered).
499. Id. at 647.
500. Id. at 648.
501. See Possley, supra note 489, at I (noting that "DNA testing showed with near
certainty that semen taken from Nicarico's body came from Dugan").
502. Cruz II, 643 N.E.2d at 647-48.
503. Id. at 648.
504. Id. at 646.
505. See supra note 489.
506. Cruz II, 643 N.E.2d at 647.
507. Id. at 639.
508. See Possley, supra note 492, at 1.
509. See id.
510. See generally Eric Zorn, Scales of Justice Remain Off Center, CHi. TRIB., Feb. 6,
1994, § 2, at 1 (noting that Margolis supported a new trial for Cruz).
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resigned rather than write the brief... Detectives and crime lab tech-
nicians associated with the DuPage County lab resigned in protest, as
did the commanders for the Illinois State Police. But although all this
was done publicly, DuPage County would not admit a mistake.
This takes us back to the theme of whether or not we can reliably
depend upon elected state officials who stand for re-election to admit
mistakes. The prosecutor who headed the DuPage County office at the
time was ambitious. He was contemplating a run for Illinois Attorney
General. He would not accept Dugan's confession, and changed the
theory of prosecution at the next trials to be that even if Brian Dugan
was telling the truth, this merely meant that he committed this crime
with Rolando Cruz.5 1 2 So, without any evidence, they fashioned a
theory which saved political face and continued to prosecute and con-
vict these innocent men for political reasons.
After Cruz was convicted a second time, another remarkable thing
happened. The (elected) Illinois Supreme Court affirmed by a four-
three vote,513 in its last decision as then constituted. Three new judges
were seated two days later. Cruz's lawyers filed a petition for rehear-
ing, and amicus briefs were submitted on behalf of most Chicago area
bar associations, a group of concerned former federal prosecutors, re-
ligious leaders, and numerous other very influential groups. The court
granted rehearing, and Cruz's conviction was reversed four-three." 4
Nothing had changed except the court's membership, as was quickly
pointed out by the prosecuting attorney.1 5 But the facts were quite
clear. The court found that the trial judge had again abused his discre-
tion.1 6
Even this limited success story shows how we are controlled by the
political whims of the given moment and how inadequate the state
system's safeguards are to prevent the kind of miscarriage of justice
that almost took place. I'm sorry to say that despite informal efforts to
5 1i. See Andrew Martin, Cruz Ruling Finds 2 on Right Side of Law, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
7, 1995, § 1, at I (noting that "Kenney refused to write a brief supporting the
conviction and death sentence of Cruz because she believed the case was marred by
misconduct").
5 1 2. See Cruz 11, 643 N.E.2d at 656.
513. People v. Cruz, No. 70407, 1992 WL 356036 (!11. Dec. 4, 1992).
5 14. Cruz 11, 643 N.E.2d at 639.
515. See Andrew Gottesman, For Ryan, A New Trial Has Political Overtones, CHI.
TRIB., July 15, 1994, § 1, at 14. Then DuPage County State's Attorney James Ryan
suggested that the Supreme Court's decision could only be explained by its change in
membership because the court voted to uphold Cruz's conviction in 1992. Id.
5 1 6. Cruz 11, 643 N.E.2d at 650.
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get the local prosecutors to admit their mistake, there has been no suc-
cess. Prosecutors in this country are rarely willing to admit errors.
Research indicates that jurors who participate in death verdicts rarely
can be persuaded later that they were wrong, even in the face of over-
whelming evidence. The Nicarico case is an exception. Many former
jurors have expressed outrage that they were misled by prosecutors
and the judge's rulings. But usually, jurors, witnesses, prosecutors
and judges have a profound and deep-seated unwillingness to admit
the possibility of error where they have participated in a process of
sentencing someone to death. We can understand why that is and
how critical it is, then, to have a fresh look by the federal courts-free
from political considerations and personal involvement.
For a postscript, here's the old "where are they now?" analysis.
Cruz and Hemandez, as innocent as you and I, are still sitting in jail,
their lives ruined.517 The judge who abused his discretion twice and
sentenced these innocent men to death is now the Presiding Judge of
DuPage County, having been elevated. The trial prosecutor who sup-
pressed favorable evidence, misled lawyers and judges, and offered
perjured testimony from jailhouse snitches was appointed a Circuit
Judge in DuPage County. The elected prosecutor who orchestrated the
unjust reconvictions of these innocent young men, despite overwhelm-
ing evidence that the real and only killer of Jeanine Nicarico is con-
fessed killer Brian Dugan, is now the Attorney General of Illinois.
So, when we consider what leverage one has in a state system to
prevent these kinds of miscarriages, we are confronted with the in-
verse. There is almost a reward for engaging in this kind of malfea-
sance. This shows that federal courts need to be involved. Very
rarely can the innocent condemned person have the benefit of the pub-
lic support, the uncompensated resources, and the time and effort of
lawyers throughout the community like these defendants did. Very
rarely is it so obvious that the wrong men have been convicted. There
are many cases such as this which are still buried in the system.
I thought it would be useful to give you a local perspective on what
can happen in any community. This is our own horror story.
Hopefully, it will have a happy ending and impress upon the powers
that be that we need to reconsider what we are doing to habeas corpus.
517. Editor's Note: Both men have since been released from jail. See supra note
489.
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RONALD J. TABAK
We are now going to turn to a religious perspective, which will be
provided by the Reverend Michael D. Place. Reverend Place is the
consul for Policy Development for the Archdiocese of Chicago, and a
member of Cardinal Bernardin's cabinet. A graduate of the Catholic
University of America, with a Doctorate in Sacred Theology, Father
Place is an adjunct faculty member of the Institute of Pastoral Studies
at Loyola University and Mundelein Seminary of the University of
Saint Mary of the Lake.
REVEREND MICHAEL PLACE
I feel a bit awkward for two reasons: first, the original invitation
went to the Cardinal. It was before his illness and his schedule pre-
cluded his attending, and in a way, I'm a stand in. Secondly, I'm not
a lawyer. What I can share, very quickly at the end of this fascinating
morning, is the current perspective of the Roman Catholic Church on
the death penalty.
There are two contexts for the Church's position. First, there is the
belief that there is something which we call objective truth, that there is
a reality which is common to human experience and that we can dis-
cover it, we can come to know it. This truth is not something that is
defined by sectarian or religious perspectives. People of good will can
come to find out what it means to be a human person and how it is that
we ought to live in society. There is something that grounds us and
sustains us in our common venture. In traditional language, we spoke
of this being the natural law. So we come to this discussion not so
much as people with belief in a creed, but as a people who hold that
there is something common to who we are as human persons and that
this "commonness" is the basis out of which we should develop our
understanding of law that serves the cause of the public morality.
Secondly, we understand that there is a possibility of development
in our understanding of human nature. We can come to understand it
better than we did before. I mention this because one could say, in
light of the Inquisition and the Crusades, that the Church has had an
uneven history on the topic of capital punishment. I hope not out of
self-justification, but out of the humility we recognize on matters of
prudential judgment such as this, that it is possible for us to accept a
development in our understanding. That certainly has been the case
regarding capital punishment.
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With those two preludes, I'd like to quickly outline the foundation
on which the Church enters this discussion. The first point is that we
perceive that there is to each human person a profound dignity. This is
the same perspective that we would bring to discussions about abor-
tion or euthanasia. There is a consistency (something which Cardinal
Bernardin has developed under the title of the Consistency of Human
Life) to our perspective that is grounded in the fact that there is a natu-
ral sacredness to each human person, an inviolability which sustains
the human person. Because we believe that there is such dignity, such
worth, such inviolability to what it is to be a human person, some con-
sequences follow. The first is we have an obligation to promote and
enhance the dignity of a human person. Secondly, we have an obliga-
tion never to directly attack or bring harm to that dignity, especially of
the innocent. Those two obligations, positive and negative, apply to
us as individuals, and from the Catholic perspective, also apply to us
as a society. We have a profound belief that the social good is part of
what we must pursue, that there is a common good which serves as
the basic grounding or context of the social order. And so we are
called to promote, enhance, and protect it.
That being said, we realize that we are in a world in which, to use
religious language, evil is present, where bad things happen.
Therefore, we recognize that we have an obligation to defend our-
selves against an unjust aggressor. Because of our dignity, we have
the right to preserve that dignity if someone comes to attack it or to
take it away. That realization, that balancing in the presence of evil,
has resulted in the development of three different, but interrelated, the-
ories: one, the theory of justified self-defense for an individual; sec-
ondly, the just war theory for how the state defends itself; and third,
the concept of capital punishment for when the state has the right, if
necessary, to impose the penalty of capital punishment in order to
serve that common good. That's the general background.
What John Paul II has done is to step back and reflect in his encycli-
cal, The Gospel of Life, or Envangelium Vitae, on the principles I
noted earlier, in light of today's social conditions. Is What has struck
him is that, from his perspective, there is about us a culture of death-
that in a way we have come to lose a sense of the profound worth and
dignity of human life, and that there seems to be in various ways and
various parts of our international community a perspective that, in fact,
enhances violence and death. A perspective that in a way has become
518. JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETrER, EVANGELIUM VITAE, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE; ON
THE VALUE AND INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE (1995).
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almost second nature to part of the human experience. He calls out
against that culture and says what we must do is reclaim a culture of
life.
In this context, he deals with the question of capital punishment.
He notes that, historically, the Church has used three reasons to justify
capital punishment in certain situations. They have been alluded to
earlier: retribution, deterrence, and reform. Since he speaks rather
obliquely as to why he does not feel those three categories sustain the
argument any longer, I'd like to put what he says in context by using
what the Roman Catholic Bishops of the State of Illinois have said on
capital punishment. They argue quite forcefully that the traditional
justifications of capital punishment no longer apply. The use of capital
punishment does not effectively deter serious crime; it does not allevi-
ate the fear of violent crime, or better safeguard people; it fails to pro-
tect society more effectively than other alternatives, such as life in
prison without parole; it does not truly restore the social order
breached by the offenders. It is not imposed with fairness, falling dis-
proportionately on racial and ethnic minorities and the poor. Neither is
it imposed in such a way as to prevent the execution of possibly inno-
cent death row inmates.
I believe it is safe to infer that it is for reasons such as the above that
the Pope has come to a conclusion that significantly develops the his-
torical perspective of the Roman Catholic Church. Let me read what
he says, set in the context of all the Church had said before. He first
says: "[T]he nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully
evaluated and decided upon."5 9 That being said, he says that "[it]
ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in the case
of absolute necessity," that is, there is no other means to defend soci-
ety.52 At the level of principle, he has restricted the historical Catholic
perspective by saying that capital punishment is permissible only in the
context of there being no other way to defend society. Then, he takes
that perspective and looks at the concrete situation of today and says
that today such conditions are rare if not practically non-existent. He
then quotes from the Catechism of the Catholic Church,2' which came
out in the last two years, to say that the non-use of capital punishment
or the elimination of capital punishment better corresponds to the
common good and the dignity of the human person.5 22 This is a rather
519. Id. at 99-100.
520. Id. at 100.
521. CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (First Image Books
1995) (1994).
522. See id. § 2267, at 605, which suggests:
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significant development in the Catholic teaching at the level of Papal
Magistarium.
The Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States have been on
record and have gone further, in a sense, than the Pope's conclusion,
saying that, at this time in the United States, the common good Would
be best preserved, for all the reasons said above, by abolishing capital
punishment. It is an opinion which we know is not held by many
Catholics in the United States. But the Bishops feel that if we are go-
ing to be consistent, that if we argue for preserving the dignity of life
in all areas, there is no way we as a society can sustain the self-image
of exacting violence for violence. Capital punishment accomplishes
nothing. In fact, it cheapens us, and cheapens the life that, in the end,
the pursuit of justice is meant to preserve.
If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor
and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority should
limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete
conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of
the human person.
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